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1 Introduction
International trade takes place within an anarchic setting. In the absence of an ultimate
adjudicator and enforcer, countries inevitably have unresolved disputes and nearly all ex-
pend resources on defense to prepare for the possibility of outright conflict or to improve
their bargaining positions under the threat of conflict. Despite the anarchic nature of in-
ternational relations, the classical liberal perspective views greater trade openness among
potential adversaries as reducing or even eliminating conflict (e.g., Polachek, 1980). One
argument in support of this view builds on the disruptive nature of conflict that prevents
the realization of at least some of the gains from trade; then, countries acting collectively
and wanting to reap those gains would have a greater interest under trade to maintain a
peaceful order. However, as is well-known with the prisoners’ dilemma being a stark and
simple example, collective rationality need not and often does not prevail. Indeed, empha-
sizing self-interest and individual rationality as well as the anarchic nature of international
relations, the realist/neo-realist perspective argues, in contrast to the classical liberal view,
that trade can aggravate conflict between nations (e.g., Waltz, 1979). Specifically, the ben-
efits from freer trade can fuel frictions, as some states perceive that they (or their rivals)
will gain a military edge in security competition.1
Our central objective in this paper is to study how the expansion of international trade
affects the intensity of conflict, measured in terms of resources allocated to it. Consider, for
example, the ongoing dispute involving China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Brunei for control over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China
Sea, where there are oil reserves. Does trade between these rivals pacify their relations
inducing them to allocate fewer resources to their respective militaries as might be implied
by the classical liberal view, or does it make their rivalry more severe?2
Previous theoretical treatments of trade and conflict in the economics literature have
identified two distinct channels through which trade between countries could influence their
military spending: a factor-price channel and an income channel. For example, based on
extensions of Heckscher-Ohlin models that emphasize differences in factor endowments,
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Garfinkel et al. (2015) study settings with two small
1Pushing this logic one step further, one could argue that actual or potential rivals would not trade with
each other (e.g., Grieco, 1990; Gowa, 1995). See Copeland (2015) for a recent survey of the theoretical and
empirical literature in international relations regarding trade and conflict.
2Similarly, one might ask how globalization in the past few decades has influenced tensions between
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan over how to divide the rights of exploration and
exploitation for oil in the Caspian Sea. Although these countries came to an agreement in August 2018, many
of the details have yet to be worked out, leaving open the possibility that this dispute could continue for
some time. (See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/europe/caspian-sea-russia-iran.html
and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-4516228..) It is worth adding here that historically trade has oc-
curred between countries even while they were at war with each other—e.g., Standard Oil selling oil to Nazi
Germany. (See Barbieri and Levy (1999) and references cited therein for additional examples.)
countries that contest a resource and can trade in world markets. A shift from autarky to
trade in such settings changes product prices and thus relative factor prices, and thereby
alters the cost of combining resources to produce military force. Depending on world prices,
then, trade can either amplify or diminish the countries’ incentives to arm and, as a result,
either intensify or pacify their dispute over the resource. Garfinkel et al. (2019) abstract from
this channel to highlight the income channel in a dynamic model, where two countries make
consumption, investment and arming decisions in the first period, as they face a strictly
positive probability in the next period of having to contest a portion of the combined returns
from their first-period investments. The authors find that trade in the first period raises the
incomes of both countries and their production of arms, with the initially smaller country
gaining some power relative to its larger trading partner and potential foe.
The analysis in this paper, based on a variant of the Ricardian model suitably extended
to allow for international disputes, studies a third channel through which trade can mat-
ter for military spending—namely, a terms-of-trade (TOT) channel. As in the canonical,
two-good, two-country Ricardian model, international differences in technology serve as
the basis for comparative advantage and provide the rationale for mutually advantageous
trade. However, in a departure from that model, we assume the input to the production of
potentially traded goods is produced with two primary resources, one of which is partially
insecure and thus subject to dispute. The disputed resource could be oil, minerals, timber,
land, or water.3 Its division depends on the countries’ “arms” or “guns,” also produced
domestically using the two primary resources. Since arming is endogenous, so too are the
residual resources and the intermediate input used in the production of consumption goods.
A key feature of this setting is the endogeneity of world prices that makes security policies
trade-regime dependent.4 To highlight the importance of this mechanism, we construct a
simple model that abstracts from the factor-price and income channels mentioned above.5
Furthermore, we abstract from many salient features of today’s world economy, such as
the presence of increasing returns, foreign investment, and growth. In addition, we do not
differentiate between the mobilization of resources for conflict and the potentially destructive
deployment of those resources, nor do we consider explicitly the disruptive effect of conflict to
3See Klare (2012), who provides many examples where the competition for scarce resources, for which
property rights are not well defined or costlessly enforceable, has turned or can turn violent.
4Insofar as trade policies can influence world prices as suggested by the empirical work of Broda, et al.
(2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011), world prices should depend on resources available to produce traded
goods and thus on arming as well. It stands to reason, then, that policymakers take that influence into
account when choosing their security (and possibly trade) policies.
5Likewise, in the small country settings considered by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Garfinkel et
al. (2015), the TOT channel of influence is non-operative. While world prices are endogenous in Garfinkel et
al. (2019), they are determined independently of the countries’ arming choices. Of course, in more general
settings, all three channels of influence could be present.
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shut down trade between warring nations.6 Instead, motivated by the empirical relevance
of military expenditures, we focus on arming.7 Insofar as resources are absorbed into
the production of arms (thus becoming unavailable for producing goods traded in world
markets), these expenditures represent an additional opportunity cost of conflict. Given
our focus, this paper can be thought of as an analysis of a modified version of the classical
liberal view, one that applies to “cold” wars.
We compare the outcomes under two polar trade regimes, autarky and free trade. As
one would expect, given the amount of resources allocated to arming, a shift from autarky
to free trade unambiguously results in higher payoffs to both countries. However, because in
our setting such a switch also influences arming decisions (or security policies), the welfare
consequences of introducing or liberalizing trade can differ significantly from those that
typically arise in mainstream analyses, which assume perfect and costless security.8
Under autarky, each country chooses its security policy so as to equate the marginal
benefit of capturing the contested resource to the marginal cost of diverting resources from
its own production and thus consumption. At the same time, each country’s arming choice
adversely affects the opponent by reducing its access to the contested resource. In equilib-
rium, both countries ignore this negative security externality and arming is strictly positive.
Importantly, trade induces each country to internalize, at least partially, the negative
externality of its security policy on the resources available to its rival. The result is a lower
incentive to arm given the rival’s policy. To be more precise, as in the case of autarky,
when the two countries trade with each other, each one chooses its arming to balance its
marginal benefit with its marginal cost. In the case of trade, however, each country’s payoff
depends on the production of its adversary’s exported good. Accordingly, an increase in
one’s own arms has an additional cost under trade: a reduction in the adversary’s share of
the contested resource and thus a reduction in the adversary’s production of its exports.
The added cost, which is reflected in a deterioration of the importing country’s TOT that
lowers the overall marginal benefit of arming relative to the marginal cost, means that a
country’s incentive to arm, given the adversary’s arming choice, is strictly lower under free
6This is not to deny the importance of conflict’s disruptive effect on trade. To the contrary, this effect is
empirically relevant (Glick and Taylor, 2010), and can be viewed as an opportunity cost of conflict that serves
as the basis for the classical liberal view as suggested above. In related research, Garfinkel and Syropoulos
(2019) explore the adversarial countries’ arming choices and their subsequent decision to either fight that
would preclude trade between them or negotiate a peaceful settlement.
7Researchers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimate that, in 2018,
global military expenditures were $1,822 billion, accounting for 2.1 percent of global GDP. The five biggest
spenders that year (in current U.S. dollar terms) were the United States ($649 billion or 3.2 percent of
GDP), China ($250 billion or 1.9 percent), Saudi Arabia ($67.6 billion or 8.8 percent), India ($66.5 billion
or 2.4 percent), and France ($63.8 billion or 2.3 percent). See Tian et al. (2019) for more details.
8Nevertheless, our welfare analysis and comparison of trade regimes resemble those in Arkolakis et al.
(2012) and Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014). The primary difference is that, in our work, real income is
endogenously determined under non-cooperative interactions in arming.
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trade than under autarky. This finding is robust to the presence of trade costs and does
not disappear when countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose tariffs.
Of course, the effect of a shift from autarky to trade on equilibrium arming and thus
on welfare depends not only on the direct effect given the rival’s arming choice, but also on
the indirect or strategic effect as the rival country’s arming changes. However, we find that
the strategic effect is, by and large, of second-order importance. That is to say, provided
the distribution of the contested resource (what we call “capital”) and the uncontested
resource (what we call “labor”) across the adversarial countries is not severely uneven,
the strategic effect tends to reinforce the direct effect or, even if it moves in the opposite
direction, is swamped by the direct effect. In either case, since trade is no worse than
autarky for a given level of arming, the reduction in arming and thus security costs render
trade unambiguously superior to autarky. This added benefit, not captured by mainstream
trade theory that abstracts from the insecurity of property, is consistent with the spirit
of classical liberalism and the writings of authors such as Angell (1933) who extolled the
virtues of trade openness and globalization.
But, there do exist sufficiently asymmetric distributions of resources where one coun-
try has a sharply larger ratio of capital to labor than its adversary to imply a sharply
greater opportunity cost of arming; this country arms by less than its rival under both
trade regimes, but a shift to trade induces it to increase its arming as its rival reduces its
arming.9 Even though the country that is induced to arm by less remains more powerful,
the resulting adverse strategic effect it realizes could swamp its gains from trade to render
trade unappealing. This finding is reminiscent of the realist/neorealist view in the inter-
national relations literature (mentioned above) that highlights trade’s effect to generate
uneven gains to trading partners and thereby differentially influence their arming and thus
the balance of power.10 However, we find that the differential influence of trade on the two
countries’ arming choices and the implied influence on the balance of power hinge on sharp
differences in the mix of their initial holdings of capital and labor, not simply on differences
in the size of their economies.11 Nonetheless, even in such cases, we find that a move to
trade, whether costly or not, results in lower aggregate arming.12
9This possibility is consistent with the empirical finding of Morelli and Sonno (2017) that asymmetries
in oil endowments across two countries reduce the pacifying effect of bilateral dependence between them in
trade and with Bevia´ and Corcho´n’s (2010) theoretical finding that sharp asymmetries in endowments can
reduce the effectiveness of resource transfers between countries to avoid war.
10Also see Garfinkel et al. (2019) mentioned above.
11Also see Bonfatti and O’Rourke (2018), who consider the role of increasing trade dependence for two
adversarial countries with the rest of the world, in a dynamic, leader-follower setting, to influence the
likelihood of a preemptive war by the follower. In that analysis, similar to ours, understanding the emergence
of conflict between the two countries does not hinge on differences in the size of their economies. But, in
Bonfatti and O’Rourke’s analysis, one fundamental sort of asymmetry is critical—that is, the leader’s ability
to block imports (necessary for arming) to the rival.
12Acemoglu and Yared (2010) find empirically that military expenditures and the size of the military in
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The logic of the TOT channel has sharply different implications for the effect of in-
creased integration of world markets on the incentives to arm by adversarial countries that
do not directly trade with each other, but instead with a friendly country. To isolate these
differences, we focus on adversaries having a similar comparative advantage.13 Suppose, in
particular, that the two adversarial countries are identical in every respect so that, even
in the absence of barriers to trade, they would not trade with each other. Also, suppose
that there exist technological differences between these countries on the one hand and the
third country on the other hand that, given the resources allocated to arming, make trade
mutually advantageous. Since the two adversaries compete in the market for the same good
exported to a third country in this case, arming generates an added marginal benefit under
trade through the TOT channel to increase arming incentives under trade relative to those
under autarky. That expanded trade opportunities with another (friendly) country can
intensify conflict between two adversaries is similar in essence to Martin et al. (2008), who
show that increasing the opportunities for trade among all countries reduces the interde-
pendence between any two and thus can make conflict between them more likely. However,
while that analysis emphasizes the importance of the disruptive effects of conflict, ours
underscores the importance of the endogeneity of arming and its trade-regime dependence.
Furthermore, our analysis, like Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Garfinkel et al. (2015),
suggests that, in this case, trade between friends could make the adversaries worse off.14
Based on the different implications of trade with the enemy versus trade with friends
for arming choices, we also provide some suggestive evidence in support of the theory. Our
empirical analysis studies how trade openness, measured inversely by trade costs, influences
national military spending, with data surrounding the end of the Cold War. An essential
feature of this analysis lies in the distinction made, using data on bilateral “strategic rival-
ries” from Thompson (2001), between countries that have no rivals and countries that do
have rivals. For countries having rivals, we further differentiate between their trade costs
with rivals and their trade costs with friends. This distinction is statistically significant,
with qualitative differences as predicted. Specifically, the estimates confirm that a country’s
military spending is positively related to its trade costs with rivals, but inversely related
terms of personnel are negatively related to trade volumes. Although that analysis treats military variables
(reflecting a country’s “nationalist” or “militarist” sentiments) as exogenous, the negative relationship found
can be viewed as preliminary evidence in support of the modified version of the classical liberal view we
consider here, focusing on military expenditures. In any case, as discussed below, we provide additional
evidence in support of this view.
13Consider, for example, India and Pakistan and their ongoing conflict over Kashmir.
14It is important to emphasize, though, that the result in this paper (with trade between friends) is due
to the beneficial effect that a country’s arming has on its own TOT to add to arming incentives, whereas
the result in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Garfinkel et al. (2015) derives from the impact of world
prices to increase arming incentives through factor prices. A similar result arises in settings with conflict
over some resource between groups within a single (small) country that trades with the rest of the world
(e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2008).
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to its trade costs with friends. These results, which are robust to a series of alternative
specifications that address concerns of possible endogeneity of the trade-cost variables in
the econometric model, complement the more structural evidence provided by Martin et al.
(2008) that increased trade flows need not always promote peace and by Seitz et al. (2015)
that reductions in trade costs bring added benefits largely through their effect to dampen
defense spending, not only by trading partners, but other countries too.
In what follows, the next section presents the basic model, focusing on just two coun-
tries that trade with one another. In Section 3, we characterize the countries’ incentives
to arm under each trade regime. Section 4 studies how equilibrium arming and payoffs
compare across trade regimes and discusses how the central results remain intact with the
introduction of trade costs. In Section 5, we extend the framework by introducing a third
(non-adversarial) country. In Section 6, we present our empirical evidence. Concluding re-
marks follow in Section 7. Technical and supplementary details are relegated to appendices.
2 Conflict in a Modified Ricardian Setting
Consider a world with two countries, indexed by superscript i = 1, 2. Each country i holds
secure endowments of two productive resources: labor, denoted by Li, and capital denoted
by Ki. Capital could be land, oil, minerals, timber or water resources. In contrast to
standard trade models, we suppose there is an additional amount of productive capital,
denoted by K0, that is not held securely by either country and is subject to dispute.
15 In
particular, each country i can use a fraction of its secure holdings of labor and capital to
produce (via a constant returns to scale or CRS technology) a composite good, “guns,”
denoted by Gi. Each country’s guns reflect its military strength used to contest K0. Once
property rights over K0 are established, each country i employs its available resources to
produce (again via a CRS technology) an intermediate good, Zi. In turn, this intermediate
good serves as the unique input to the production of two (and potentially tradable) final
consumption goods. As in the canonical Ricardian model, markets are perfectly competitive,
and comparative advantage is due to international differences in technology.
We present our model in three steps. First, we describe the baseline model of trade, for
given guns Gi and thus for a given resource base available to produce the intermediate good
Zi. Second, departing from the canonical Ricardian model of trade, we introduce conflict,
and show how guns affect this resource base and thus the production of Zi. Finally, we
describe the determination of equilibrium for given guns and derive the associated payoff
functions that play a central role in our subsequent analysis of endogenous guns choices,
contingent on the trade regime in place.
15With an appropriate choice of K0 and K
i, our analysis could capture conflicts over what would appear
to be one country’s resource. See Caselli et al. (2015), who examine empirically the importance of the
proximity of oil fields to countries’ shared border in the escalation of conflict between them.
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2.1 Baseline Model of Trade for Given Guns
Preferences and demand functions. As in the standard Ricardian model, consumer
preferences in each country i = 1, 2 are defined over the two consumption goods and cap-
tured by U i = U(Dii, D
i
j), where D
i
j denotes the quantity of good j (= 1, 2) a representative
consumer in country i demands.16 This utility function is increasing, quasi-concave, ho-
mogeneous of degree one and symmetric over the two goods, with a constant and finite
elasticity of substitution, denoted in absolute terms by σ ∈ (0,∞).17
Let pij and Y
i denote respectively the price of consumption good j and national income
in country i. Then, country i’s indirect utility function can be written as V i = µiY i,
where µi = [(pii)
1−σ + (pij)
1−σ]1/(σ−1) (for i 6= j = 1, 2) represents the marginal utility of
income, which is decreasing and homogeneous of degree −1 in prices.18 By Roy’s identity,
the demand function for good j in country i is
Dij = γ
i
jY
i/pij , (1)
where γij ≡ γij(pii, pij) = −(∂µi/∂pij)/(µi/pij) = (pij)1−σ/[(pii)1−σ + (pij)1−σ] denotes country
i’s expenditure share on good j.
Production possibilities of final goods. Given the quantity of intermediate good Zi in
country i (= 1, 2), let Sij denote the quantity of its final good j (= 1, 2). To produce one
unit of good j, producers in country i need aij > 0 units of Z
i. Thus, each country i = 1, 2
faces the following production-possibilities constraint:
ai1S
i
1 + a
i
2S
i
2 = Z
i, where Sij ≥ 0. (2)
As in the standard model, comparative advantage is due to international differences in
productivity and not to differences in factor endowments.19 To fix ideas, we assume that
country i has a comparative advantage in good i; that is, aii/a
i
j < a
j
i/a
j
j for i 6= j = 1, 2,
which states that the opportunity cost in country i in producing good i is lower than the
corresponding opportunity cost in country j ( 6= i). Furthermore, to economize on notation
16Our analysis, with a focus on just two consumption goods, considers adjustments only at the intensive
margin, but could be extended to consider a continuum of consumption goods, as in Dornbusch et al. (1977).
We chose the two-good version of the model in view of researchers’ general familiarity with it and because
it reveals the possibility that trade in the presence of conflict can be welfare reducing.
17Assuming CES preferences is not critical here, but helps simplify notation.
18More precisely, µi is the inverse of the price index that is dual to the CES aggregator.
19We impose this production structure with an intermediate input for convenience. An analytically equiv-
alent approach would be to assume that the production functions of traded goods in each country differ by
a Hicks neutral factor of proportionality, but not in factor intensities. Importantly, our approach isolates
the TOT effects on arming by abstracting from factor-endowment based rationales for trade patterns and
possible adjustments in arming decisions due to trade related factor-price effects (that have already been
studied in extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model—e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2015).
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and emphasize the importance of other variables of interest, we normalize aii = 1 and let
αi ≡ aij > 1.
Trade regimes and product prices. Naturally, the allocation of Zi across the two in-
dustries depends on product prices and thus on the trade regime in place. Let ci denote
the cost of producing one unit of Zi. (We will describe the properties of ci shortly.) Each
country i’s income Y i is given by Y i = ciZi.
Under autarky, both consumption goods must be produced domestically. Then, compet-
itive pricing in product markets requires pii = c
i and pij = α
ici, which give the equilibrium
relative price of good j under autarky: piA = p
i
j/p
i
i = α
i, a constant. In turn, with the
demand functions (1), piA determines the division of income between goods. This divi-
sion along with the product market-clearing requirement that Dij = S
i
j for each good j
determines (by (2)) equilibrium quantities.
Turning to the case of free trade, perfect competition requires once again that pii = c
i,
since country i always produces good i. Furthermore, absent trade costs, perfect competition
requires pij = min[α
ici, cj ] for i 6= j = 1, 2.20 It follows that at least one country will cease
to produce the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage so that pij = p
j
j = c
j for
i 6= j = 1 and/or 2. For now, let us suppose that each country i’s demand for good j is
fulfilled entirely by imports. Then, world prices that clear the market for good j satisfy
Dij + D
j
j = S
j
j = Z
j for j (6= i) = 1, 2. Since under free trade consumers face identical
prices and consumer preferences are identical across countries, their expenditure shares on
each good will not differ: γij = γ
j
j = γj for j 6= i = 1, 2. Maintaining our focus on the
market for good j, now let piT ≡ pij/pii denote the relative domestic (and, since trade is free,
world) price of country i’s imported good j ( 6= i). Substitution of the demand functions (1)
with the competitive pricing relations into the market-clearing condition implies
piT = γjZ
i/γiZ
j , i 6= j = 1, 2, (3)
where γj = (p
i
T )
1−σ/[1+(piT )
1−σ] and γi = 1−γj .21 This expression reveals that the relative
price of good j for country i under free trade depends on its supply of the intermediate
good relative to that of its rival, Zi/Zj . More precisely, let a hat “ˆ” over a variable denote
its percentage change (e.g., x̂ ≡ dx/x); then, by logarithmically differentiating (3), while
20To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, we abstract for now from trade costs (tariffs and/or
non-tariff trade barriers). We explicitly consider such costs in Section 4.2.
21Another way to obtain (3) is to set world relative demand for good j (i.e., (Dij+D
j
j )/(D
i
i+D
j
i ) = γj/γip
i
T )
equal to its corresponding world relative supply (i.e., Sjj/S
i
i = Z
j/Zi) and then solve for piT . Of course,
depending on endowments, technology, and consumer preferences, piT could be determined by one country’s
autarkic price. We revisit this possibility later.
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accounting for the dependence of the expenditure shares on piT , one can confirm
p̂iT =
1
σ
[
Ẑi − Ẑj
]
, i 6= j = 1, 2. (4)
Thus, an exogenous increase in Zi/Zj expands the relative supply of country i’s exported
good, thereby worsening its TOT, piT .
2.2 Conflict and the Endogeneity of Intermediate Inputs
Having described the baseline model, we now introduce conflict between the two countries
over contested capital K0. After specifying the technologies for producing guns G
i and the
intermediate input Zi, we derive the equilibrium (Z1, Z2) for given (G1, G2)
Conflict technology. With the ultimate goal of maximizing national welfare V i, each
country i chooses its guns Gi to contest K0 and thereby expand its capacity to produce
consumption goods. More precisely, we assume that country i secures a share φi of K0 that
depends on guns produced by both countries as follows:
φi = φ(Gi, Gj) =
f(Gi)
f(Gi) + f(Gj)
, i 6= j = 1, 2, (5)
where f(·) > 0, f(0) is arbitrarily close to 0, f ′(·) > 0, and f ′′(·) ≤ 0. This specification
of the conflict technology, also known as the “contest success function” (CSF), implies that
country i’s share of K0 is increasing in its own guns (φ
i
Gi
> 0) and decreasing in the guns
of its adversary (φi
Gj
< 0, j 6= i). Moreover, φi is symmetric; so G1 = G2 ≥ 0 implies
φ1 = φ2 = 12 .
22 The influence of guns on the division of K0 between the two countries can
be thought of as the result of either open conflict (without destruction) or a bargaining
process with the countries’ relative military strength playing a prominent role.23
Technologies for guns and intermediate goods. Guns are produced with secure labor
and/or capital endowments. Letting wi and ri denote the competitive rewards paid to
labor and capital in country i respectively, define ψ(wi, ri) as the cost of producing one
gun in country i. This unit cost function, which is identical across countries, is increasing,
concave and homogeneous of degree one in factor prices. By Shephard’s lemma, its partial
derivatives ψiw and ψ
i
r give the conditional input demands in the production of one gun.
Thus, the quantities of resources diverted to contesting K0 in each country i are ψ
i
wG
i and
22See Skaperdas (1996), who axiomatizes a similar specification that is standard in the contest and conflict
literatures. Our slight modification, requiring f(0) to be positive but arbitrarily close to 0, is helpful in our
proofs of existence of equilibrium in arming choices. (One example is f(G) = (δ + G)b with b ∈ (0, 1] and
δ > 0.) More generally, the appeal of this specification for our analysis derives from the fact that, because
it is well understood, it allows us to highlight the effects of the option to trade for arming incentives.
23See Anbarci et al. (2002) who study how alternative bargaining solution concepts translate into rules
of division that differ in their sensitivity to guns. Also see Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2018) for a related
analysis in a trade-theoretic setting.
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ψirG
i, with ψir/ψ
i
w representing the corresponding capital-labor ratio in the guns sector.
24
Once guns have been produced and the disputed resource has been divided according
to (5), the residual quantities of labor and capital available to country i to produce Zi
are respectively LiZ = L
i
g − ψiwGi and KiZ = Kig − ψirGi, where Lig ≡ Li and Kig ≡ Ki +
φiK0 denote “gross” quantities of these primary resource factors. We can now identify
the unit cost ci of producing Zi introduced above with c(wi, ri).25 This function, too,
is identical across countries, increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one in factor
prices. Furthermore, LiZ = c
i
wZ
i and KiZ = c
i
rZ
i represent the relevant input demand
functions, with cir/c
i
w giving the capital-labor ratio demanded in the production of Z
i.
Determination of intermediate goods. Factor-market clearing in each country i (= 1, 2)
requires
cirZ
i + ψirG
i = Kig (6a)
ciwZ
i + ψiwG
i = Lig. (6b)
Our assumptions on the unit cost functions imply that the above system of equations can
be solved to obtain the relative wage, ωi (≡ wi/ri), and the quantity of Zi available for the
production of consumption goods. We describe this solution as follows. For given guns, we
rearrange and combine (6a) and (6b) to obtain
cir
ciw
=
Kig − ψirGi
Lig − ψiwGi
. (7)
The right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation represents the capital/labor ratio kiZ ≡
KiZ/L
i
Z supplied, whereas the left-hand side (LHS) represents the value of k
i
Z demanded.
Condition (7) implicitly defines the equilibrium wage-rental ratio ωi ≡ wi/ri in country i as
a function ofKig, L
i
g, andG
i to ensure factor-market clearing—that is, ωie ≡ ωie(Kig, Lig, Gi).
By our assumption of perfect competition, the value of country i’s production of the
intermediate input (denoted by Ri, which coincides with the value of domestic production)
equals ciZi. Equations (6a) and (6b), together with the linear homogeneity of the unit cost
functions, imply Ri = wiLig + r
iKig − ψiGi. In turn, since Zi = Ri/ci, we have
Zi(ωi,Kig, L
i
g, G
i) =
ωiLig +K
i
g − ψ(ωi, 1)Gi
c(ωi, 1)
. (8)
24Throughout, we assume that the secure labor and capital resource constraints do not bind in the pro-
duction of guns for either country i: Li − ψiwGi > 0 and Ki − ψirGi > 0.
25Henceforth, we assume c(wi, ri) 6= ψ(wi, ri), thereby embedding a neoclassical structure in an otherwise
classical model, rich with political economy implications. More specifically, building on the model’s mech-
anism (derived below) that connects factor rewards to arming, one could generate novel insights into the
possible linkages between the distribution of national income, defense and external conflict.
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Then, using ωie implied by (7) in the RHS of (8) delivers Zie ≡ Zie(Kig, Lig, Gi), which we
refer to as the optimized production of the intermediate input. Given Gi, Kig and L
i
g, this
optimized quantity is independent of the trade regime in place.26 Observe especially that
Zie depends not only on Gi directly, but also on guns produced by both countries indirectly
through Kig. Thus, as we will see below, this function plays a pivotal role in our analysis
of equilibrium security policies. Henceforth, to avoid notational cluttering, we omit the “e”
designation in the superscript when referring to the equilibrium values of Zi and ωi.
2.3 Equilibrium and Payoff Functions Given Guns
Bringing the essential elements of the model together, the sequence of events is as follows:
Stage 1. Each country i (= 1, 2) simultaneously (and noncooperatively) chooses its guns
Gi to maximize V i, using its secure endowments (Li units of labor and Ki units of capital).
Stage 2. Once the contested resource K0 is divided according to φ
i induced by the arming
choices made in stage 1, each country i uses its remaining inputs (LiZ units of labor and
KiZ units of capital) to produce the intermediate good, Z
i.
Stage 3. Each country i uses its output of Zi to produce Sii and S
i
j units of consumption
goods i and j respectively, which are traded domestically and/or internationally depending
on the trade regime in place.
Having presented, given Gi (i = 1, 2), the conditions for the equilibrium determination of Zi
in stage 2 (Section 2.2) and for the equilibrium allocation of Zi across sectors j = 1, 2 in each
country i in stage 3 contingent on the trade regime in place (Section 2.1), we turn to study
the non-cooperative, subgame perfect equilibria in security policies (i.e., the determination
of guns) in stage 1. As the final step in preparing for this analysis, we now derive the
trade-regime dependent payoff functions V i = µiY i for each country i = 1, 2.
To that end, recall that, since country i always produces the good in which it has a
comparative advantage, pii = c
i necessarily holds. That competitive pricing relationship
implies, in turn, µ(pii, p
i
j)c
i = µ(1, pi). For what follows, define m(pi) ≡ µ(1, pi), where
m′(pi) < 0. Then, recalling that Y i = ciZi, where Zi satisfies (7) and (8), allows us to
write the payoffs V iJ under autarky (J = A) and free trade (J = T ) as follows:
V iJ = m(p
i
J)Z
i(Ki + φiK0, L
i, Gi), for i 6= j = 1, 2. (9)
An important feature of country i’s payoff function under autarky (V iA) is that, since p
i
A = α
i
is constant, so is m(piA). Thus, each country i’s arming decision under autarky that maxi-
mizes V iA depends solely on how G
i influences the optimized value of the intermediate input,
Zi. Guns production influences the payoffs under trade V iT , like those under autarky V
i
A,
26See Lemma A.1 (presented in Appendix A) that also shows how Zie and ωie depend on Kig, L
i
g, and G
i.
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through its effect on Zi. However, country i’s production of guns influences V iT through an
additional channel—namely, through its effect on the relative price of country i’s imported
good, piT . Specifically, from (4), an increase in G
i, given Gj , expands Zi and reduces Zj ,
and thereby raising piT . This deterioration of country i’s TOT alone reduces its payoff under
trade V iT through m(p
i).
While one of our primary goals in this paper is to explore the trade-regime dependence of
arming incentives and the associated welfare implications, it is instructive to see how payoffs
under autarky and trade compare for given guns. Based on a standard, gains-from-trade
argument using (9) for J = A, T , one can establish the following:
Lemma 1 For any given feasible guns and gross factor endowments, payoffs under autarky
and trade are ranked as follows: V iA ≤ V iT , for each i = 1, 2.
Intuitively, when country i’s cost of importing good j (piT ) does not differ from its oppor-
tunity cost of producing the good itself (αi = piA), country i produces both goods locally,
implying it obtains identical payoffs under the two trade regimes. Trade flows between the
two countries will be strictly positive, given guns, only when piT ≤ αi (with strict inequality
for at least one country) to make both countries at least as well off and at least one country
strictly better off under trade than under autarky.27 Any payoff increases due to a shift to
free trade (given arming) reflect the familiar gains from trade that follow from canonical
trade models based on comparative advantage.
3 Endogenous Security Policies
We now turn to the determination of non-cooperative, subgame perfect equilibria in security
policies and their dependence on trade regimes. Inspection of the objective functions under
autarky (J = A) and under trade (J = T ) in (9) reveals that the equilibrium production
of the intermediate input, represented by the envelope function Zi in (8), is of central
importance here. As noted earlier, given the countries’ guns choices, Zi is independent
of the prevailing trade regime. Thus, the trade-regime dependence of arming incentives
operates solely through a TOT channel.
To set the stage for this analysis, we make two additional observations that can be
verified from (8).28 First, the effect of a marginal increase in country i’s gross endowment
of capital Kig = K
i+φiK0 on Z
i is given by ZiK = r
i/ci and the effect of a marginal increase
in its arming Gi (given Kig) on Z
i is Zi
Gi
= −ψi/ci. Second, an increase in Gi also affects
the rival’s optimized production of the intermediate good Zj through its influence on the
rival’s gross capital endowment, Kjg : Z
j
K = r
j/cj . Bringing these observations together,
27Of course, if piT < p
i
A = α
i holds for both countries, then each country i specializes completely in the
production of good i and both are strictly better off under trade.
28Also see the proof of Lemma A.1 presented in Supplementary Appendix B.1
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while noting from (5) φj
Gi
= −φi
Gi
, shows:
dZi
dGi
= K0φ
i
GiZ
i
K + Z
i
Gi =
1
ci
[
riK0φ
i
Gi − ψi
]
(10a)
dZj
dGi
= K0φ
j
Gi
ZjK = −
1
cj
[rjK0φ
i
Gi ], (10b)
given Gj , for i 6= j = 1, 2.
3.1 Autarky
As revealed by the payoff functions under autarky shown in (9) for J = A where m(piA) =
m(αi) is a constant, V̂ iA = Ẑ
i holds. Thus, country i’s arming choice influences V iA only
through its effect on the maximized value of country i’s intermediate input, Zi. From (10a),
each country i’s first-order condition (FOC) for the choice of guns Gi, taking Gj as given,
can be written as
1
m(αi)
∂V iA
∂Gi
=
dZi
dGi
=
1
ci
[
riK0φ
i
Gi − ψi
] ≤ 0, i = 1, 2. (11)
The first term in the brackets on the RHS of (11) reflects the marginal benefit of producing
an additional gun for country i. Specifically, given Gj , an increase in Gi increases the share
of the disputed resource K0 that country i captures in the contest, thereby increasing its
income and payoff. However, as shown in the second term, that additional gun reduces
country i’s income as it diverts resources away from the production of Zi. Each country’s
optimal security policy balances this trade-off at the margin. Importantly, the negative
influence of country i’s security policy on country j’s payoff through its effect on Zj (shown
in (10b)) does not directly enter this calculus.
Maintaining focus on the case in which the secure resource constraints on guns produc-
tion do not bind, equation (11) is an exact statement of country i’s FOC under autarky.
Furthermore, the conflict technology (5) implies interior solutions with (11) holding as an
equality. Since Zi is concave in the country’s own guns Gi and in the country’s gross capital
endowment Kig (see parts (c) and (e) of Lemma A.1 presented in Appendix A) and K
i
g is
concave in Gi through the conflict technology (5), we can show that V iA is strictly quasi-
concave in Gi. This property ensures the existence of an interior (pure-strategy) equilibrium
in security policies. Let (G1A, G
2
A) be an equilibrium pair of guns. Some additional (but
relatively mild) assumptions imply the equilibrium is unique:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium security policies under autarky.) An interior equilibrium in
security policies exists under autarky: GiA > 0, for i = 1, 2. Furthermore, if labor and
capital are sufficiently substitutable in the production of arms and/or the intermediate
good, this equilibrium is unique.
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Since each country’s problem under autarky is effectively one of maximizing income or,
equivalently, the quantity of the intermediate good used in the production of traded goods,
the equilibrium in security policies under autarky is independent of the elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption. Matters differ, however, in the case of trade.
3.2 Free Trade
As previously discussed, security policies under trade, like those under autarky, affect payoffs
through their impact on the output levels of the intermediate good. However, when trade
is possible, these output changes also affect world prices as shown in (4). Using (4) and (9)
for J = T and noting that
m′(piT )
m(piT )
piT = −γj , one can verify the following:
V̂ iT = Ẑ
i +
[
m′(piT )
m(piT )
piT
]
p̂iT = Ẑ
i − γj
σ
(
Ẑi − Ẑj
)
, i 6= j = 1, 2. (12)
The second term in the most RHS of (12) captures the TOT effect of changes in (Zi, Zj).
Combining (10) with (12), the FOC for country i’s arming choice becomes:
1
m(piT )
∂V iT
∂Gi
=
1
ci
{[
1− γj
σ
−
(
rj/cjZj
ri/ciZi
)
γj
σ
]
riK0φ
i
Gi −
[
1− γj
σ
]
ψi
}
≤ 0, (13)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Similar to the FOC under autarky (11), this FOC consists of two
components: the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of an additional gun. However,
the negative effect of an additional gun on country i’s TOT modifies these two components
substantively as compared with autarky, due to the negative effect of an increase in i’s guns
on the rival’s output Zj .
To characterize the equilibrium under trade, we henceforth assume that σ > γj for
j = 1, 2, so that the possibility of immiserizing growth (Bhagwati, 1959) is ruled out.29
This assumption, however, does not ensure that the marginal benefit of arming, when
evaluated at Gi = 0, is strictly positive. Digging a little deeper, let us define
ζj ≡ r
i/ciZi
rj/cjZj + ri/ciZi
=
cjZj/rj
ciZi/ri + cjZj/rj
, for i 6= j.
The function ζj reflects country j’s relative size in terms of the countries’ GDP, net of arming
and measured in domestic units of the insecure resource. Then, the sign the marginal benefit
for country i (i.e., the first term in (13)) is determined by the sign of σ−γj/ζj . Accordingly,
there exists a critical value of σ, σi ≡ γj/ζj evaluated at Gi = Gj = 0 for each country
i 6= j = 1, 2, such that country i’s marginal benefit of arming when Gi = 0 is strictly
29The possibility of immiserizing growth requires dV iT /dZ
i < 0 and normally arises if the elasticity of
substitution in consumption is sufficiently low. However, from (12), we have sign{dV iT /dZi} = sign{1−γj/σ},
which is positive for all equilibria (interior or not) provided σ > γj .
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positive (non-positive) if σ > σi (σ ≤ σi).
Since γ1 + γ2 = ζ
1 + ζ2 = 1, there are two distinct possibilities to consider: (i) σ1 =
σ2 = 1, which arises when the two countries have identical secure endowments;30 and, (ii)
σi > 1 > σj for i 6= j = 1, 2, which arises in the presence of asymmetries. Thus, if σ ≤ 1,
the marginal benefit of arming must be non-positive for at least one country i (the relatively
larger one) and possibly both; if σ > 1, the marginal benefit of arming must be positive for
at least one country j (the relatively smaller one) and possibly both. Also observe that the
maximum value of σi across i, σ ≡ max[σ1, σ2], is greater than or equal to 1.
Building on these ideas and using the FOC under trade (13), it is possible to verify that
an equilibrium always exists. However, multiple equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are
possible. Nonetheless, provided the strength of the two countries’ comparative advantage,
represented by αi for i = 1, 2, are sufficiently high, a pure-strategy equilibrium that dif-
fers from the one under autarky exists under free trade.31 Letting (G1T , G
2
T ) denote that
equilibrium, we have
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium security policies under free trade.) Suppose the conditions
that ensure a unique equilibrium under autarky are satisfied and each country’s comparative
advantage (αi) is sufficiently strong. Then, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in
security policies under free trade that is distinct from the equilibrium under autarky: (i)
GiT = 0 for i = 1, 2 if σ ≤ σ ≡ max[σ1, σ2] and (ii) GiT ( 6= GiA) > 0 for i = 1, 2 if σ ∈ (σ,∞).
Observe that the elasticity of substitution in consumption (σ) plays an essential role
under free trade, as it determines the magnitude of the TOT effect. If the two goods are
distant substitutes (i.e., σ ≤ σi holds for one country i = 1, 2 or both), then country i’s
payoff under trade is highly dependent on country j’s production, through relative world
prices. Even though an increase in guns by country i, where initially Gi = 0 and given
Gj ≥ 0, generally implies a positive net marginal benefit of arming for given world prices
(i.e., riK0φ
i
Gi
− ψi > 0), that additional gun implies at the same time a worsening of its
TOT. More precisely, it brings about both an increase in the supply of its exported good
and a decrease in the supply of its imported good. This negative TOT effect tends to reduce
the effective marginal benefit of an additional gun by more than it reduces the marginal
30Specifically, in a symmetric equilibrium, we have Zi = Zj which implies piT = 1 and thus γi = γj =
1
2
for i = 1, 2 (see the proof of Proposition 3 for some details). Since equilibrium factor prices are also identical
across countries, ζj = 1
2
holds in this benchmark case. Thus, σ > 1 (σ ≤ 1) implies that the marginal benefit
of arming is strictly positive (non-positive) at Gi = 0 for both i.
31The potential problem, as analyzed in Supplementary Appendix B.1, is that piT can vary only within
the range [1/αj , αi], giving rise to a possible discontinuity in country i’s best-response function under trade
such that it coincides with country i’s best-response function under autarky for some Gj . Requiring that
comparative advantage αi be sufficiently strong for both i = 1, 2 ensures the existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium in security policies that is distinct from the equilibrium under autarky. But, even when this
requirement is satisfied, we cannot rule out the possible existence of multiple equilibria in pure strategies.
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cost. When σ < σi, our specification of the conflict technology (5), with φi
Gi
∈ (0,∞) at
Gi = 0, implies country i chooses to produce no guns at all. If, in addition, σ ≤ σj , then
GjT = G
i
T = 0. But, even if σ > σ
j while σ ≤ σi, our specification of the conflict technology
(5) requiring that f(0) be arbitrarily close to zero (even if positive) implies that country
j’s best response to Gi = 0 is to produce an infinitesimal amount of guns. Therefore, when
σ ≤ σ ≡ max[σ1, σ2], we have G1T = G2T = 0.32
When the two consumption goods are sufficiently substitutable (i.e., σ > σ ≥ 1), the
negative effect through the TOT channel is not large enough to wipe out the positive net
marginal benefit of arming given world prices when evaluated at Gi = 0 for either country i.
The conditions specified in the proposition along with (5) ensure, in this case, the existence
of an interior equilibrium in security policies under trade that differs from the equilibrium
under autarky. What’s more, the externality of each country j’s arming on the rival’s payoff
remains negative in this equilibrium: dV iT /dG
j < 0.33
4 Equilibrium Arming and the Relative Appeal of Trade
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium payoffs under the two trade regimes,
denoted by V i∗A ≡ V iA(GiA, GjA) in the case of autarky and V i∗T ≡ V iT (GiT , GjT ) in the case
of trade, for i 6= j = 1, 2. Combining Lemma 1 with the equilibrium analysis underlying
Propositions 1 and 2, the next lemma establishes that a sufficient condition for trade to
dominate autarky is simply that trade results in lower arming by both countries:
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium payoffs under autarky vs. free trade.) Suppose that trade induces
both countries to arm by less as compared with autarky. Then, each country is strictly
better off under free trade than under autarky (i.e., V i∗T > V
i∗
A for i = 1, 2), and the
difference in payoffs for both exceeds each country’s standard gains from trade.
The potential benefit of moving to free trade can be decomposed into three parts. First,
given both countries’ arming choices, each country can enjoy the standard gains from trade
that are, by Lemma 1, non-negative for both countries and strictly positive for at least one.
Second, each country enjoys, given its own arming choice, a positive strategic effect as the
opponent reduces its arming. Finally, each country’s payoff rises, as it optimally adjusts
32Observe that σ ≤ 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) for trade to effectively remove both countries’
incentive to arm. Furthermore, while our assumption that σ > γj rules out immizerising growth as a
possible explanation for reduced arming incentives under trade in this analysis, lower values of σ do imply
more generally both a greater likelihood of such a phenomenon and lower incentives to arm.
33One can confirm this claim, which also holds true when σi > σ > 1, by evaluating
∂V iT /∂G
j
V i
=
dZi/dGj
Zi
− γj
σ
[
dZi/dGj
Zi
− dZ
j/dGj
Zj
]
,
at the value of dZ
i/dGj
Zi
from (12) implied by country j’s FOC under trade for an interior solution, to find
that a necessary and sufficient condition for ∂V iT /∂G
j < 0 is that σ > 1.
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its own arming choice in response to the new trade regime. Of course, in the presence
of asymmetries in secure resources, one country could become less powerful under trade
relative to its position under autarky. However, provided that both countries reduce their
arming, each realizes lower security costs on top of the standard gains from trade.
4.1 Arming under Autarky vs. Free Trade
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we now study the difference in equilibrium guns chosen by
the two adversaries under the two trade regimes. Proposition 1 established that, under
autarky, GiA > 0 for i = 1, 2. By contrast, Proposition 2 showed that, under free trade,
GiT = 0 for i = 1, 2 when σ ≤ σ.34 Thus, when the two goods are sufficiently distant
substitutes in consumption, equilibrium arming is lower under free trade and, by Lemma
2, each country’s welfare is higher; countries enjoy not only the standard gains from trade,
but also the elimination of security costs it induces.
When the two consumption goods are sufficiently substitutable (i.e., σ > σ), however,
each country’s optimizing choice of guns is strictly positive under both autarky and free
trade. But, a comparison of the FOCs under autarky (11) and trade (13) reveals the adverse
TOT effect of a country’s own arming reduces the marginal benefit of an additional gun
relative to the analogous marginal benefit under autarky by more than it reduces the relative
marginal cost. Thus, for any given Gj , country i’s best response under free trade is strictly
less than its best response under autarky: BiT (G
j) < BiA(G
j) for any Gj ≥ 0, i 6= j = 1, 2.
This finding gives us a sufficient but not necessary condition for trade to induce lower
equilibrium arming when arming is strictly positive under both trade regimes. Specifically,
if neither country’s security policy exhibits strategic substitutability in the neighborhood
of the autarkic equilibrium, then there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium under free trade
where both countries choose lower arms.
Whether a country’s best-response function is positively or negatively sloped in the
neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium depends on how an increase in the opponent’s
guns Gj influences country i’s marginal benefit and marginal cost of arming.35 An increase
in Gj (given Gi) reduces country i’s gross capital (Kig) and, thus, reduces its relative wage
(ωi) and so its marginal cost of arming. This effect alone induces country i to produce
more guns as Gj rises. The effect of an increase in Gj on country i’s marginal benefit
of arming, however, can be positive or negative. Specifically, the conflict technology (5)
implies φi
GiGj
R 0 as BiA(Gj) R Gj . Thus, when BiA(Gj) > Gj (BiA(Gj) < Gj), the implied
positive (negative) effect of Gj on country i’s marginal benefit of arming alone induces it
to produce more (less) guns.
This discussion suggests that the sufficient condition for trade to lower equilibrium
34As noted above, arming by one country could be strictly positive, but would be infinitesimal.
35See equation (A.5) in Appendix A that unveils the determination of the sign of the slope of BiA(G
j).
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arming and enhance each country’s payoff can be traced back to fundamentals that influence
relative arming by the two countries under autarky—namely, the distribution of secure
resources.36 Building on this idea with the assumption that the conditions of Propositions
1 and 2 are satisfied, we establish the following:
Proposition 3 (Secure resource distributions and a comparison of arming.) Suppose the
elasticity of substitution in consumption is sufficient large (i.e., σ > σ). Then, there exists
a set of secure resource distributions with a sufficiently even mix of labor and capital across
countries i such that GiA > G
i
T > 0 for i = 1, 2.
The set of resource distributions for which trade induces lower equilibrium arming includes
the benchmark case that we refer to as complete symmetry: countries have identical initial
(secure) resource endowments in addition to identical preferences (defined symmetrically
over the two consumption goods) and technologies for producing Zi and Gi. Since they
arm identically under autarky, φi
GiGj
= 0 holds, and both countries’ security policies neces-
sarily exhibit strategic complementarity in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium, as
illustrated in Fig. 1(a). Starting at point A (i.e., where GiA = GA > 0 for i = 1, 2), a shift
to free trade induces both countries’ best-response functions to rotate at the origin towards
the 45o line and intersect at a new equilibrium with less arming by both countries (point T ,
where 0 < GiT = GT < GA for i = 1, 2).
37 As shown in the proof to this proposition, there
also exist asymmetric distributions of secure resources that similarly imply a symmetric
equilibrium in security policies under autarky and thus satisfy the sufficient condition for
trade to induce lower arming. Furthermore, by continuity, there exist other asymmetric
distributions adjacent to that set, which imply asymmetric equilibria under autarky and
hence φi
GiGj
< 0 for one country i, but for which the positive effect of an increase in Gj
on country j’s marginal cost of arming dominates. Hence, both countries’ security policies
continue to exhibit strategic complementarity, such that once again a shift from autarky
to trade implies lower arming by both countries. It follows from Lemma 2 that, for distri-
butions associated with a sufficiently even mix of secure resources, a shift to free trade is
welfare-improving for both countries; what’s more, their gains from trade are strictly greater
than those predicted by the traditional paradigm that abstracts from conflict altogether.
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that a shift from autarky to free trade
implies greater arming by one country. For such an outcome to arise, the mix of secure
36The fact that relative endowments are observable and contain information regarding differences in the
degree of resource security across countries makes this focus appealing over considering, for example, differ-
ences in the countries’ technologies for producing guns or asymmetries in the conflict technology.
37Proposition B.1 presented in Supplementary Appendix B.1 shows GT is increasing in the elasticity of
substitution in consumption for σ > 1 (= σ), approaching GA (which is independent of σ) as σ → ∞.
Thus, consistent with Hirshleifer’s (1991) argument, the savings in security costs afforded by trade equal
zero when the two goods are perfect substitutes and increase as σ falls approaching 1 (or equivalently as the
two economies become increasingly “integrated”).
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labor and capital resources held initially by the two countries must be sufficiently uneven to
generate large differences in their arming choices under autarky that imply ∂BiA/∂G
j < 0
for i 6= j = 1 or 2.38 But, even in this case, we could have GiT < GiA for i = 1, 2. A more
extreme asymmetry in secure resource endowments across countries is required for trade to
induce one country to become more aggressive, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b), which assumes
that country 2 has the higher capital/labor ratio and thus arms less under autarky than
its rival.39 Starting from the autarkic equilibrium depicted by point A in the figure, a shift
to free trade causes each country’s best-response function to rotate at the origin inward
towards the 45o line, resulting in a new intersection at point T , with decreased arming by
country 1 but increased arming by country 2.
What are the welfare implications of trade when trade induces one country (2) to expand
its arming? Because country 1 arms less heavily under trade than under autarky, country
2 enjoys a positive strategic welfare effect as well as the standard gains with a move from
autarky to trade. By contrast, due to the adverse strategic effect of country 2’s arming, it
is possible for trade to reduce country 1’s payoff. Such a preference ranking is more likely
to hold when country 1’s strength of comparative advantage (α1) and thus the standard
gains it realizes from trade are relatively small. Either way, the possibility that trade could
induce greater arming by one country under some circumstances illustrates one potential
(although perhaps remote) limit to the classical liberal view.
4.2 The Effects of Trade Costs
Given our focus above on free trade, one might naturally wonder how trade costs matter.
In this subsection we extend the analysis to study the importance of import tariffs and
non-tariff trade barriers for arming and payoffs. Henceforth, to avoid complications related
to discontinuities in best-response functions, we assume that, for any given secure resource
endowments, the strength of each country i’s comparative advantage (αi) is sufficiently
large and the initial levels of trade costs sufficiently low, so that each country i’s internal
prices differ from its autarky prices and thus its demand for good j is entirely satisfied
by its imports: M i = Dij for j 6= i = 1, 2. Let τ i and ti respectively denote one plus an
iceberg type trade cost and ad valorem tariff rate on its imports, and define piT and q
i
T
as the corresponding internal and external relative prices of the same product. Arbitrage
implies that, in a trade equilibrium with positive trade flows, piT = τ
itiqiT holds. As shown
38Equation (A.5) in Appendix A and the conflict technology (5) together imply that, at most, one country’s
best-response function can be negatively sloped in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium.
39Note the scale for G1 in the figure is more concentrated such that the slope of the “45o” line drawn is
greater than 45o. Numerical simulations based on a particular parameterization of the model confirm that
an increase in arming by one country is possible only under extremely uneven secure distributions of the
two primary resources. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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in Supplementary Appendix B.2, the percentage change in i’s payoff V iT under trade is
V̂ iT =
(
1− ρi) Ẑi + ρiẐj − ρi [εj τ̂ i + (εj − 1) τ̂ j + ηj t̂j]
+
(
γij/t
i∆
)
ηi
[
1− (ti − 1) (εj − 1)] t̂i, (14a)
for j 6= i = 1, 2, where
εi ≡ −∂M
i/∂piT
M i/piT
= 1 + (σ − 1) t
iγii
tiγii + γ
i
j
(14b)
ηi ≡ − ∂M
i/∂piT
M i/piT
∣∣∣∣
dU i=0
= εi − γ
i
j
tiγii + γ
i
j
= σ
(
tiγii
tiγii + γ
i
j
)
> 0 (14c)
∆ ≡ εi + εj − 1 (14d)
ρi ≡
[(
ti − 1) εi + 1
ti
](
γij
∆
)
. (14e)
Note that εi (resp., ηi) is the absolute value of country i’s Marshallian (compensated) price
elasticity of import demand. Also note that sign
{
εi − 1} = sign{σ − 1}. For specificity and
clarity, hereafter we focus on the case where σ > 1, which implies ∆ > 1 and ρi ∈ (0, 1).
With (14) and our analysis of security policies under autarky we now arrive at
Lemma 3 (Arming incentives under trade.) For any given guns Gj > 0, we have BiT (G
j) <
BiA(G
j) for j 6= i = 1, 2.
Generalizing our analysis in Section 4.1, this lemma shows that a move from autarky to
trade, whether free or distorted with trade costs, reduces each country’s incentive to arm
given the rival’s guns. Strikingly, this result remains valid even if tariffs are chosen non-
cooperatively and simultaneously with security policies.40 Building on this lemma, one can
establish the following:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium arming.) Aggregate equilibrium arming under trade is strictly
less than that under autarky: G1T + G
2
T < G
1
A + G
2
A. However, depending on consumer
preferences, technology and the distribution of secure endowments, it is possible to have
GiT > G
i
A for one country i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, as in the case of free trade, trade distorted with tariff and non-tariff barriers induces
one adversary (and possibly both) to reduce its arming below the autarkic level. Still,
it is possible for one adversary to produce more guns under trade than under autarky.41
40As in standard analyses of trade wars that abstract from resource disputes and the associated resource
costs, autarky is always a possible equilibrium when tariff policies are chosen non-cooperatively; however,
as suggested by the previous literature, an interior equilibrium in tariff policies normally exists even when
countries differ in size (e.g., Johnson, 1953-54; Kennan and Riezman, 1988; and, Syropoulos, 2002).
41Numerical analysis confirms the possibility that one country arms by more under trade, when the
international distribution of secure resources is extremely uneven (see Supplementary Appendix B.2).
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Nevertheless, regardless of how it affects each country’s security policy, trade always brings
about a reduction in aggregate arming.
To get some sense of how trade costs influence arming incentives, let us return to our
assumption of complete symmetry where the two countries have identical initial endowments
of labor and capital, as well as technologies, but allow trade costs to differ across countries.
Focusing on non-tariff (or non-revenue generating) trade costs, τ i, we can establish
Proposition 5 (Differences in non-tariff trade costs and relative arming under complete
symmetry.) In a unique trade equilibrium, differences in non-tariff trade costs generate
differences in equilibrium arming as follows: τ i Q τ j implies GiT Q G
j
T .
While this proposition considers a very special case, it allows us to identify a fundamental
force at work here that can drive a wedge between equilibrium arming of two adversaries
that are otherwise identical. Starting at the benchmark case where τ i = τ j > 1, the two
countries arm identically under trade and, according to the logic presented above, by less
than they would arm under autarky. A decrease in country i’s trade costs τ i leads to a
reduction in each country’s domestic price of the imported good (piT and p
j
T ↓), thereby
augmenting each country’s dependence on imports from its rival (γij and γ
j
i ↑). However,
these effects are more pronounced for country i, such that piT /p
j
T < 1 and γ
i
j/γ
j
i > 1. As
a result, GiT < G
j
T for τ
i < τ j . Furthermore, aggregate arming is less than when τ i = τ j ,
suggesting that a decrease in trade costs for one country amplifies trade’s pacifying effects.
Moving beyond the case of identical adversaries, numerical analysis shows further that,
under most circumstances, globalization (i.e., τ i ↓ for i = 1, 2 or both) reduces both
countries’ equilibrium arming.42 To be sure, consistent with our analysis in Section 4.1,
there do exist sufficiently uneven international distributions of secure resources to imply
that the smaller country j’s arming rises as τ i falls (i.e., dGjT /dτ
i < 0). However, exhaustive
numerical analysis (assuming αi = ∞) confirms that, under all circumstances, aggregate
arming falls and each country’s payoff rises.
The analysis of tariffs (ti) is, as one would imagine, more complex and thus more difficult
to characterize in a succinct way. Specifically, the effect of an increase in ti on arming
depends not only on the distribution of secure resources but also on tj and the initial level of
ti, giving rise to non-monotonicities in both equilibrium arming and payoffs. Nonetheless,
based on numerical methods, we obtain some important results when comparing various
equilibrium outcomes, including autarky (A), free trade (F ) and “generalized war” (W ),
where (in the last case) both countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their
security and trade policies.43 In particular, consistent with our priors based on the analysis
42Details are provided in Supplementary Appendix B.2.
43Again, see Supplementary Appendix B.2.
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above and with the idea that trade wars have a prisoner-dilemma feature, we find that, under
most circumstances, GiA > G
i
W > G
i
F and V
i
A < V
i
W < V
i
F . However, when one country
(i) is extremely larger than its rival (j), a different ranking of arming emerges for both
countries. The smaller country (j) arms more heavily under free trade than under autarky,
and it arms by even more under generalized war: GjW > G
j
F > G
j
A. Nonetheless, the ranking
of its payoffs is the same as when the countries are more equally sized. While the much
larger country (i) continues to arm by less under free trade than under autarky, its arming
under generalized war is the lowest (GiA > G
i
F > G
i
W ), suggesting that its extremely larger
size renders its trade policy more effective in influencing its TOT. Furthermore, similar to
Syropoulos’ (2002) finding in a setting with secure property rights, we also find that this
country prefers generalized war over the other outcomes: V iA < V
i
F < V
i
W . What is perhaps
surprising is that this extremely large country prefers all these outcomes to those that would
obtain if there were no resource insecurity and thus no arming at all.
5 Trading with Friends
While the analysis above provides analytical support to the notion that trade can be paci-
fying in international relations, our focus has been on two economically interdependent
countries. In this section, we explore how the nature of the trading relationship between
the contending nations can matter, showing a possible limit to the optimism of the classical
liberal view. In particular, in contrast to our setting above where differences in technology
to produce consumption goods render trade between adversaries mutually advantageous,
we now consider a setting where the structure of technology is such that they do not trade
with each other, but instead they trade with a third, non-adversarial country. Extending
the analysis to a three-country, two-good model, we show that a shift to free trade can
induce greater arming, even in the case of complete symmetry.44
Suppose consumers in all three countries (i = 1, 2, 3) have identical CES preferences
defined over two consumption goods j = 1, 2, with σ > 1.45 As before, the two adversar-
ial countries (i = 1, 2) have identical technologies for producing guns to contest K0 and
the intermediate good; in addition, they have identical technologies for producing the two
consumption goods: a11 = a
2
1 = 1 and a
1
2 = a
2
2 = a2 > 1, implying the relative price of
good 2 under autarky in both countries satisfies piA = pA = a2 for i = 1, 2. The third
country (i = 3) is not involved in the contest over K0 and, hence, considered “friendly.” Its
technology for producing the intermediate good is the same as that for the two adversaries;
but its technology for producing consumption goods j = 1, 2 is described by a31 > a
3
2 = 1,
which implies p3A = a
3
1. Thus, 1/p
3
A < pA. Not surprisingly, the third country’s presence
44We briefly consider the case of (possibly asymmetric) trade costs below.
45Although our results extend to the case where σ = 1 (with exceptions noted below), we maintain the
assumption that σ > 1 for consistency with our analysis in Section 4.2 and for ease of exposition.
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has no effect on arming incentives under autarky. Therefore, the resulting outcome is as
characterized in Proposition 1.
When trade is possible, preferences and the production structure specified above imply
countries 1 and 2 export good 1 in return for imports of good 2 from country 3. Under
free trade, all countries face the same relative price for good 2, denoted by pT ≡ p2/p1,
and this price balances world trade. Since the countries have identical and homothetic
preferences and face identical world prices, their expenditure shares are identical. Complete
specialization in production implies that Y i = p1Z
i for i = 1, 2, and Y 3 = p2Z
3, such that
Di2 = γ2Z
i/pT (i = 1, 2) and D
3
1 = γ1pTZ
3. In turn, it implies that the world market-
clearing condition is given by pT (D
1
2 + D
2
2) = D
3
1. As such, pT = γ2(Z
1 + Z2)/γ1Z
3. Now
differentiate this expression logarithmically, keeping the intermediate output of country
3 (Z3) fixed in the background, and rearrange to find: p̂T =
1
σ (ν
1Ẑ1 + ν2Ẑ2), where
νi = Zi/(Z1 + Z2) for i = 1, 2 represents country i’s import share.
As in the two-country case, country i’s security policy under trade affects the relative
price of its imported good through its impact on Zi for i = 1, 2, that satisfies (7) and (8).
This effect, in turn, makes the incentive to arm trade-regime dependent.46 Furthermore, as
before, an increase in arming by country i reduces rival j’s production of the intermediate
good given Gj—i.e., dZj/dGi < 0 for i 6= j = 1, 2, by (10b). The key difference here is that
the decrease in Zj now improves country i’s terms of trade.
To see how this difference matters in determining arming incentives, note first that each
adversary’s payoff function under free trade V iT can be written as before and shown in (9)
for J = T , but now m(piT ) = m(pT ) with
m′(pT )
m(pT )
pT = −γ2 for i = 1, 2. Then, differentiate
V iT to obtain
V̂ iT = Ẑ
i +
[
m′(pT )
m(pT )
pT
]
p̂T = Ẑ
i − γ2
σ
(
νiẐi + νjẐj
)
. (15)
Using (10) in (15), country i’s FOC under free trade can be written as:
1
m(pT )
∂V iT
∂Gi
=
1
ci
[(
1− ν
iγ2
σ
+
νjγ2
σ
[
rj/cjZj
ri/ciZi
])
riK0φ
i
Gi −
(
1− ν
iγ2
σ
)
ψi
]
≤ 0, (16)
for i 6= j = 1, 2. The first term inside the outer square brackets reflects country i’s marginal
benefit of arming, whereas the second term reflects its marginal cost. Assuming σ > 1 is
sufficient to ensure that both terms are positive for each adversary. Furthermore, we assume
sufficiently strong comparative that, in the case of symmetry where the two adversaries are
46Note, if the two adversarial countries were so small that their production of the intermediate input had
no influence on pT , their security policies would not affect prices, and therefore would not be trade-regime
dependent. The sharp contrast of this result with that of Garfinkel et al. (2015) stems from the presence of
a factor-price channel that is (intentionally) absent in the present analysis.
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identical in terms of their initial secure resource endowments, ensures the existence of a
unique equilibrium under free trade.47 Then, using (16) and the FOC under autarky (11)
for each country i, one can show the following:
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium arming and payoffs under free trade with a third, friendly
country.) Suppose that two identical adversarial countries potentially compete in the same
market for exports to a third, friendly country. Then, a shift from autarky to free trade (a)
induces each adversary to arm more heavily, and (b) can be welfare reducing for both.
The intuition for part (a) is that, with trade, each country has an interest in producing more
guns at the margin not only to appropriate more K0 and thus produce more Z, but also
to reduce its rival’s output, thereby improving its TOT with its friendly trading partner.48
Additionally, as one can verify, an increase in the elasticity of substitution in consumption
(σ) reduces the magnitude of this TOT effect.49 But, part (b) establishes, with intensified
conflict between the two contending countries, trade brings higher security costs, and these
higher security costs can swamp the gains from trade. In the proof, we establish this
possibility based on comparative advantage that is just strong enough to ensure a unique
equilibrium in arming under trade, while making the gains from trade very small.50
Applying our earlier logic from the two-country case shows both adversarial countries
(i = 1, 2) produce more guns under costly trade than under autarky. We now ask how
differences in non-tariff trade costs influence their arming choices, maintaining our focus
on the case of identical adversaries.51 Let us define τ i ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2 as an iceberg type
trade cost for i’s imports from the friendly country and τ3i ≥ 1 analogously for country
3’s imports from country i = 1, 2. Differences in τ i naturally lead to differences in import
shares νi2 and expenditure shares γ
i
2. However, if we assume τ
3
i = τ
3
j (i 6= j = 1, 2) for
simplicity, only the effects on γi2 matter for this comparison, allowing us to establish
47Assuming sufficiently strong comparative advantage once again allows us to focus on the case where
the boundary conditions on the world price of country 1 and 2’s imported good in terms of their exported
good, pT ∈ (1/p3A, pA) for i = 1, 2, do not bind, whereby we can abstract from the potential complications
associated with discontinuities in the best-response functions as before. We do, however, discuss these issues
in the detailed proof of Proposition 6(b), presented in Supplementary Appendix B.1.
48In its quest for raw resources with an aim to match Great Britain’s access and thus be better able to
compete with Great Britain in the export of manufactures to third-countries, Germany invaded parts of
Eastern Europe at the outset of WWII. Eventually shifting its efforts westward, Germany had hoped that it
could negotiate some sort of peaceful settlement with Great Britain. But, of course, no such settlement was
reached. Our analysis suggests that, insofar as Germany and Great Britain did not trade with each other,
each side had an interest to fight, even if costly, for TOT (among other) reasons.
49In the limiting case where σ = ∞, this effect vanishes and arming incentives for both adversaries are
identical across the two trade regimes.
50Furthermore, we expect that admitting the possibility of trade in arms between the third friendly country
and each of the two adversaries would not change our results qualitatively and, in fact, could amplify the
positive effect of trade on arming incentives, implying even greater security costs and a larger likelihood of
negative welfare consequences.
51Tariffs render the analysis much more complex because of TOT and volume-of-trade effects.
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Proposition 7 (Differences in non-tariff trade costs with friends and relative arming under
symmetry.) In a unique trade equilibrium with positive trade flows, differences in non-tariff
trade costs across two adversaries that each trade with a third, friendly country generate
differences in equilibrium arming as follows: τ i Q τ j implies GiT R G
j
T .
In sharp contrast to the case where two adversaries trade with each other, the country
facing lower trade costs tends to arm by more.52 Numerical analysis confirms this result
holds beyond the case of identical adversaries. What’s more, if τ j is fixed, then a decrease
in τ i induces greater arming by both adversaries.53 We have also studied numerically an
extension of the model to three goods. Maintaining our assumption that the adversaries
(i = 1, 2) are identical, but assuming each country i = 1, 2, 3 enjoys a comparative advantage
in producing good i, we suppose that (i) τ ij = τ
j
i and (ii) τ
3
i = τ
i
3 for i 6= j = 1, 2. Then, we
find trade-cost reductions between adversaries reduce arming, whereas trade-cost reductions
between friends expand arming: dGiT /dτ
i
j > 0 and dG
i
T /dτ
3
i < 0 for i 6= j = 1, 2.54
6 Empirical Evidence: Trade Costs and Military Spending
Our theory supplemented with numerical analysis generates testable predictions regarding
the impact of trade costs on military spending. Specifically, consistent with the classical
liberal view, the analysis in Section 4 implies that trade costs between rivals should have a
positive impact on their military spending; by contrast, the analysis of Section 5 suggests
that trade costs between countries viewed as friends could have a negative effect on their
military spending, provided they have rivals.
6.1 Empirical Specification and Strategy
To test these predictions, we specify the following econometric model:
MLTRY SPENDi,t = β0 + β1TRADE COSTS RIVALSi,t + β2TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t
+β3TRADE COSTS NRi,t + CONTROLSi,tβ4 + ξt + ξi + i,t, (17)
where MLTRY SPENDi,t is the logarithm of military expenditures in country i at time
t, taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The two key
covariates of interest are TRADE COSTS RIVALSi,t and TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t, re-
flecting the trade costs of countries that have rivals, classified as such using data on “strate-
52Of course, in the case where σ = 1, expenditure shares are independent of prices and thus trade costs,
such that GiT = G
j
T even when τ
i 6= τ j .
53In addition, a decrease in τ i for given τ j increases V iT and reduces V
j
T . However, we also find that, when
bilateral trade costs are symmetric (i.e., τ i = τ3i for i = 1, 2), τ
i Q τ j implies GiT Q GjT due to a differential
(and dominant) effect on import shares. (See Supplementary Appendix B.2 for more details.) Nonetheless,
numerical analysis shows that, for fixed τ j = τ3j , an increase in τ
i = τ3i leads to a decrease in arming by
both adversaries provided that τ i is sufficiently high.
54Details are available from the authors on request.
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gic rivalries” between country-pairs from Thompson (2001).55 TRADE COSTS RIVALSi,t,
in particular, is defined as the logarithm of the weighted average of the bilateral trade costs
faced by country i for exports to its rivals at time t, with the size of the rival’s market used
as the weight.56 Our theory predicts β1 > 0. TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t is defined as
the logarithm of the weighted average of the bilateral trade costs faced by country i (which
has rivals) for exports to its friends. According to our theory, we expect β2 < 0.
In addition to the theoretically motivated covariates in (17), we also control for other
potential determinants of military spending. In particular, since only a subset of the coun-
tries in our sample have rivals, we add TRADE COSTS NRi,t, defined as the logarithm of
the weighted average of trade costs faced by the countries having no rivals in our sample.
The vector CONTROLSi,t includes proxies for country size, such as the logarithm of Gross
Domestic Product (GDPi,t) and the logarithm of i’s population (PPLNi,t). We also control
for the stability of a country’s government (INSTITUTIONSi,t), for whether a country has
rivals or not (RIVALSi,t), and for the extent to which the country is involved in geopolitical
conflict (HOSTILITYi,t).
57 In the spirit of Redding and Venables (2004), we control further
for relative size/market power within rivalries using the following index:
RLTV POWERi,t ≡ ln
(
Yi,t ×Πσ−1i,t
/ [∑
j
Ej,t × P σ−1j,t
])
. (18)
The numerator in (18) captures the market power of the exporters in country i in time t,
and it is defined as the product between the value of output in i, Yi,t, and the outward mul-
tilateral resistance, Πσ−1i,t , of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), which can be interpreted
as a “Market Access” index following Redding and Venables (2004). Similarly, the denomi-
nator in (18) is designed to capture the market power of importers in the destination/rival
country j, and it is defined as the product between the size of the rival’s market j, measured
55More precisely, Thompson’s (2001) indicator records whether or not there exists a threat of war between
two countries based on observed diplomatic tensions; as such, two countries need not be involved in a war
to be classified as “strategic rivals.” We view Thompson’s definition of strategic rivalry, which does not rely
exclusively on militarized disputes, as particularly appropriate for our purposes. Furthermore, Thompson’s
dataset includes the largest number of strategic rivalry cases, as compared with Diehl and Goertz (2000)
and Bennett (1996, 1997). Supplementary Appendix B.3 offers some details regarding these data and the
countries covered in our sample.
56We follow the structural gravity literature to construct our trade-cost variables, using data taken from
Baier et al. (2019) that are based on total manufacturing trade data from UNCTAD’s COMTRADE. First,
we apply the latest developments in the empirical gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014) to obtain the
vector of bilateral trade costs from a panel Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) specification with
exporter-time, importer-time and pair fixed effects, along with time-varying bilateral policy variables for free
trade agreements (FTAs), membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a set of time-varying
border variables to account for common globalization effects. Guided by the theoretical gravity literature
(e.g., Anderson and Neary, 2005; Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2014), we then aggregate bilateral trade
costs to the country level. See Supplementary Appendix B.3 for further details.
57Data on these additional control variables come from the dynamic gravity data set of the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission. (See Gurevich and Herman (2018) for details on this database.)
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by j’s expenditure Ej,t, and the inward multilateral resistance, P
σ−1
j,t , of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), which can be interpreted as a “Supplier Access” index following Redding
and Venables (2004).58 The summation in the denominator of (18) is used to deal with the
few instances where a given country has more than one rival at the same time.59
Finally, in most of our specifications, we include year fixed effects (ξt) to capture any
global trends. In our most demanding specification, we also employ country fixed effects
(ξi) to account for any observable and unobservable time-invariant country characteristics
that could affect military spending. Combining all data sources resulted in an unbalanced
panel dataset with 67 countries over the period 1986–1999. The starting date of our sample
was determined by the trade dataset of Baier et al. (2019) used to construct the trade-cost
variables, while the ending date was set by Thompson’s (2001) strategic rivals dataset.60
6.2 Results
Our main estimates appear in Table 1. To establish the robustness of our findings and
to better understand the channels through which trade costs affect military expenditures,
we start with simple correlations on which we build gradually. Column (1) of Table 1
reports the results when we include only the three trade-cost covariates. The estimates of
the effects of TRADE COSTS RIVALSi,t and TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t are precisely
as predicted by our theory. Specifically, the positive estimate of β1 suggests that greater
trade costs with rivals weaken the pacifying effects of trade on their military spending,
while the negative estimate of β2 suggests that, for countries having rivals in our sample,
greater trade costs with friends weaken the amplifying effects of trade on their the military
spending. Finally, the large, negative, and statistically significant estimate of the coefficient
on TRADE COSTS NRi,t reflects an inverse relationship between trade costs and military
spending for countries having no rivals in our sample. While our theory does not speak
directly to this last result, it appears to be fairly robust and strikes our interest as it seems
to contradict the classical liberal view.
Notably, the R2 of the estimated model in column (1), consisting of only three covariates,
seems quite large. In general, and especially in combination with the varying signs, the
good fit suggests a strong correlation between trade costs and military expenditures, which
is encouraging for this line of research. One possible explanation for the strong fit is that the
trade-cost measures proxy for national trade, which in turn is highly correlated with country
58Capitalizing on the additive property of the PPML estimator (see Arvis and Shephard, 2013; Fally, 2015)
applied to the same specification that we use to estimate bilateral trade costs (equation (B.26) presented in
the Supplementary Appendix B.3), we recover the numerator in (18) from the exporter-time fixed effects in
our estimating gravity model as Yi,t × Πσ−1i,t = χi,t. Similarly, we obtain the denominator in (18) from the
importer-time fixed effects in the same gravity regression as Ej,t × Pσ−1j,t = ϕj,t.
59Such instances arise in our sample for Argentina, Egypt, and Israel.
60Additional details regarding the countries and active rivalries between them in our sample, as well as
summary statistics, can be found in Supplementary Appendix B.3.
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size, and larger countries tend to devote more resources to military spending. However, as
we demonstrate next, even in the presence of the full set of controls, the trade-cost covariates
remain significant and with the predicted signs.
Building on our baseline model, we introduce additional control variables and add year
fixed effects in column (2) of Table 1. The estimated coefficients on the control variables are
mostly intuitive. Specifically, the positive estimates of the effects of GDPi,t suggests that
larger countries devote more resources to military spending. The negative and statistically
significant estimates of the coefficients on PPLNi,t and INSTITUTIONSi,t show that, all
else equal, countries with larger population and stronger institutions devote less resources
to their respective military sectors. The positive estimate of the effects of HOSTILITYi,t
is also intuitive, suggesting that countries with more hostile environments devote more
resources to their militaries. The estimate of the coefficient on RIVALSi,t is negative, but
not statistically significant. This finding and the statistical insignificance of the estimate on
RLTV POWERi,t suggest the other control variables successfully control for the variation
in these covariates in our specification. Most importantly for our purposes, the estimates
of the coefficients on the two key covariates for trade costs with friends and rivals, though
smaller in magnitude, retain their signs and remain statistically significant.
Arguably, our focus on trade costs in this empirical analysis circumvents a number of
endogeneity concerns that would arise had we used trade flows instead. Specifically our
approach, by design, removes all country-specific determinants of trade flows. Nevertheless,
some endogeneity concerns could remain. One such possibility is omitted variable bias.
For example, the indicator variable for rivalries in the Thompson data fails to capture
likely variation in the intensity of ongoing rivalries between countries over time that could
influence both their defense expenditures and their trade policies, and thus their trade costs.
Other possible concerns include the general equilibrium forces and the endogeneity of trade
policies that can impact the weights used to aggregate bilateral trade costs.
To address these issues, we implement an IV estimator. Specifically, we follow Feyrer
(2009, 2019) to construct an instrument that relies on relative changes in distance-based
trade costs as61
predicted tradei,t = exp (κˆt)
∑
i 6=j exp
(
κˆij + βˆdist,tDISTij
)
, (19)
where, κˆt and κˆij are the estimates of the time fixed effects and the country pair fixed effects
from a bilateral gravity regression; βˆdist,t are the time-varying estimates of the impact of
distance on trade from the same regression. Given our setting, we construct two such
61Consistent with our approach of employing pair fixed effects to model bilateral trade costs in our struc-
tural gravity estimations, we implement the more demanding specification to construct the instrument from
Feyrer with pair fixed effects. This is equation (12) on page 15 in Feyrer (2019).
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instruments, one for trade with friends and one for trade with rivals. For both, we employ
the distance between the capital cities.62
The estimates reported in column (3) of Table 1 are obtained with an IV estimator that
employs the two instruments just described. We also include lags of the two instruments
that allow us to gauge their validity via an over-identification test. Two findings stand
out. First, our instruments pass the “weak identification” (WeakId) Kleibergen-Paap Wald
test for joint significance of the instruments as well as the joint over-identification test with
χ2 = 1.482, (p-val = 0.477). Second and more importantly, the estimated effects of the two
key trade variables remain statistically significant and have the predicted signs.
We conclude the analysis with our most demanding specification where, in addition to
using the IV estimator from column (3), we introduce country fixed effects and account
for clustering of observations at the country level. Several findings stand out from the
resulting estimates reported in column (4). First, a number of the covariates lose statis-
tical significance; some (for example, TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t, GDPi,t, and PPLNi,t)
are no longer statistically significant. We attribute this result largely to the inclusion of
the country fixed effects. In particular, since country fixed effects account for and ab-
sorb all time-invariant country-specific variables that influence military spending, we are
left only with variation over time within countries to identify the impact of the country-
specific covariates in our setting; that we also include fixed year effects and our sample
covers a relatively sort time period reinforces this effect.63 Second, we see in column (4)
that, even in the presence of the country fixed effects and the clustered standard errors,
the estimate on TRADE COSTS RIVALSi,t remains sizable, marginally statistically sig-
nificant, and with a positive sign as predicted by our theory. In addition, the estimate
on TRADE COSTS FRIENDSi,t, though statistically insignificant, has a negative sign as
predicted and its magnitude has not changed much either.64 Finally, the last column of
62This measure of distance differs from the two used by Feyrer (2019): (i) the standard population-weighted
distance measure from the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) and (ii)
the measure of sea distance, constructed by Feyrer himself. We do not use Feyrer’s sea-distance measure
since the match between the country pairs covered by this measure and the countries in our sample leads to
a substantial loss in the number of observations. We do not use the standard population-weighted distance
either, because it might not be fully exogenous in our setting, particularly if there are territorial conflicts
that alter borders and overall distance between countries. However, even in such cases, it seems unlikely
that the distance between capital cities would be affected. It should also be noted that the correlations
between the three distance measures (sea, population-weighted and between capitals) is larger than 0.9.
63Let us add, however, that the inclusion of the country fixed effects and the clustering of standard errors
by country appear to have independent effects. Specifically, when we introduce these estimation features
sequentially, we find that the country fixed effects have a greater impact on the estimates and corresponding
standard errors on GDPi,t and PPLNi,t, while clustering the standard errors per country has a greater
impact on the significance of the trade-cost variables.
64We also perform three sensitivity experiments that confirm the robustness of our findings: (i) we use
a vector of bilateral trade costs based only on estimates of the pair fixed effects from a structural gravity
regression; (ii) we employ theory-consistent weights to aggregate the vector of bilateral trade costs to the
country level; and, (iii) we obtain estimates using only years from our sample that correspond to the Cold
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Table 1 reports standardized (beta) coefficient estimates, which reveal the large relative
importance of the estimates of the two key trade costs covariates in support of our theory.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a Ricardian model of trade, modified to include two primary resources
and augmented by conflict between two countries over one of those resources. It features a
TOT channel that renders arming choices trade-regime dependent. Specifically, a country’s
arming under trade has an additional effect on its own payoff, by influencing the adversary’s
production and thus world prices. Exactly how trade influences arming incentives depends
on the structure of comparative advantage and trade costs.
When the two countries in conflict also trade with each other, the impact of a country’s
arming on its TOT is negative. Provided these countries are sufficiently symmetric, not only
in terms of technologies and preferences, but also in terms of the mix of their secure resource
endowments, equilibrium arming by both is lower and their payoffs higher under trade than
under autarky. These results, which are robust to the presence of trade costs, provide
theoretical support to the long-standing classical liberal hypothesis that increased trade
openness can ameliorate conflict and thus amplify the gains from trade. With sufficiently
extreme differences in the distribution of the primary resources, a shift to trade could
induce one country to arm more heavily and to such an extent so as to imply that autarky
is preferable over trade to the other country.65 Nevertheless, in an equilibrium that involves
positive trade flows, the aggregate allocation of resources to dispute the insecure resource
is lower than in an equilibrium with no trade at all.
When the structure of comparative advantage is such that the two adversaries do not
trade with each other, but instead trade with a third, friendly country and they compete in
the same export market, the TOT effect of security policies is positive. As such, a shift from
autarky to trade unambiguously intensifies international conflict, possibly with negative net
welfare consequences.
Consistent with the model’s predictions, our empirical analysis provides reduced-form
evidence that the effects of trade costs on a country’s military spending depend qualitatively
on whether trade is with a rival or with a friend. Our findings complement the more
structural evidence presented by Martin et al.’s (2008), that increased opportunities for
multilateral trade can aggravate bilateral conflict, increasing the likelihood of war. They
also complement Seitz et al. (2015)’s evidence that a decrease in trade costs between two
countries reduces their military spending, which reduces such spending by other countries.
War period. See Supplementary Appendix B.3 for further details.
65In ongoing research, we have extended the the analysis to capture the presence of a non-tradable goods
sector, finding that, even in the case of complete symmetry, different factor intensities across the tradable
and non-tradable sectors can cause the classical liberal view to fail.
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A potentially fruitful extension of our analysis involves considering multiple commodities
traded among multiple trading partners (for example, along the lines of Eaton and Kortum,
2002). While capturing the direct and cross-price effects of security policies, this modeling
choice would enable us to expand the sets of countries to explore, for example, the theoretical
implications of trade among countries with no rivals for arming. We could, then, scrutinize
our finding of a negative and fairly robust correlation between trade costs and arming for
such countries. This extension could also incorporate the presence of nontraded sectors,
thereby mapping more closely to reality. Equally important, by admitting the presence of
multiple channels of influence between trade and arming, this richer setting would be more
suitable for structural estimation. As such, it could complement nontrivially the analysis
of Acemoglu and Yared (2010), who emphasize the effects of national military spending on
trade, by studying the two-way causality between arming and trade.
The analysis could also be extended to study how security policies matter for trade
agreements by conditioning trade negotiations on a threat-point that coincides with the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in trade and security policies. This approach could also
shed light on the implications of linking security policies, not just with trade agreements,
but also with sanctions and foreign aid (Maggi, 2016).
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Table 1: International Trade Costs and Military Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CORR CNTRLS IV IV-FEs BETAs
TRADE COSTS RIVALS 0.229 0.103 0.214 0.202 0.370
(0.039)∗∗ (0.052)∗ (0.082)∗∗ (0.116)+
TRADE COSTS FRIENDS -0.775 -0.082 -0.226 -0.220 -0.460
(0.028)∗∗ (0.038)∗ (0.065)∗∗ (0.576)
TRADE COSTS NR -0.666 -0.113 -0.152 -0.085 -0.185
(0.023)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗ (0.036)∗∗ (0.557)
LN GDP 1.461 1.347 0.059 0.042
(0.062)∗∗ (0.068)∗∗ (0.272)
LN PPLN -0.546 -0.507 0.403 0.267
(0.042)∗∗ (0.044)∗∗ (0.673)
INSTITUTIONS -0.053 -0.053 -0.032 -0.093
(0.008)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
HOSTILE 2.751 2.525 1.051 0.028
(0.484)∗∗ (0.441)∗∗ (0.243)∗∗
RIVALS -0.510 -0.379 -0.253 -0.049
(0.313) (0.416) (0.358)
RLTV POWER 0.165 0.234 0.078 0.023
(0.114) (0.129)+ (0.211)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
N 904 875 810 810 810
R2 0.647 0.807
Weak Id χ2 65.793 11.04
Over Id χ2 1.456 0.695
Notes: This table reports results from a series of specifications, based on equation (17), that quantify the impact
of trade costs on military spending. The dependent variable is always the logarithm on national military
spending and all estimates are obtained with the OLS estimator. All specifications distinguish between the
impact of trade costs of countries that have rivals to their rivals (TRADE COSTS RIVALS) or to their friends
(TRADE COSTS FRIENDS). The estimates in column (1) are correlations obtained without any controls
and without any fixed effects. The estimates in column (2) introduce additional controls, as described in the
main text, and add year fixed effects. The estimates in column (3) are obtained with an IV estimator. The
results in column (4) are obtained with the IV specification from column (3) but after also adding a full set of
country fixed effects. Finally, the last column reports standardized (beta) coefficients, which are based on the
specification in column (4). Columns (1)-(3) report robust standard errors, while the estimates in column (4)
are obtained with standard errors clustered by country. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. See the main text
for further details.
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A Appendix
This appendix presents proofs of the propositions and lemmas in the main text. Additional
results and more technical details can be found in Supplementary Appendix B.
Lemma A.1 For any given feasible quantities of guns and gross factor endowments, the
equilibrium wage-rental ratio ωi is independent of the prevailing trade regime (autarky or
trade). Furthermore,
(a) ∂Zi(ωi, ·)/∂ωi = 0 and ∂2Zi(ωi, ·)/∂(ωi)2 > 0, s.t. ωi = arg minωi Zi(ωi, ·);
(b) ∂ωi/∂Kig > 0, ∂ω
i/∂Lig < 0, and ∂ω
i/∂Gi R 0 if cir/ciw R ψir/ψiw;
(c) ∂Zi/∂Kig > 0 and ∂
2Zi/(∂Kig)
2 < 0;
(d) ∂Zi/∂Lig > 0 and ∂
2Zi/(∂Lig)
2 < 0;
(e) ∂Zi/∂Gi < 0 and ∂2Zi/(∂Gi)2 < 0 for fixed Kig.
Proof: See Supplementary Appendix B.1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let G
i
be the quantity of guns country i would produce if all of
Li and Ki were employed in that sector. Assuming f(0) is arbitrarily close to 0 implies that
limGi→0 f ′(Gi) and thus limGi→0 φiGi in (11) are arbitrarily large for any G
j ≥ 0. Therefore,
∂V iA/∂G
i > 0 as Gi → 0. Furthermore, by the definition of Gi and our assumption that both
factors are essential in the production of Zi, V iA(G
i
, Gj) < V iA(G
i, Gj) for all Gi < G
i
that
imply Zi > 0; therefore, ∂V iA/∂G
i < 0 for a sufficiently large Gi ∈ [0, Gi]. The continuity
of V iA in G
i, then, implies that there exists a best-response function for each country i,
Gi = BiA(G
j) ∈ (0, Gi), such that (11) holds as an equality.
Existence. As in Garfinkel et al. (2015), to establish existence it suffices to show ∂2V iA/
(
∂Gi
)2
< 0 at Gi = BiA(G
j). In the proof of Lemma A.1, we establish the following effects of
marginal changes in wi, Kig and G
i on Ziw:
Ziww = −(ciwwZi + ψiwwGi)/ci > 0
ZiwK = −riciw/(ci)2 < 0
ZiwGi = −(ψiwci − ciwψi)/(ci)2.
Then, while keeping ri fixed in the background (thus attributing any implied changes in
ωi to changes in wi) and using the FOC associated with BiA in (11), an application of the
implicit function theorem to the envelope condition Ziω(ω
i, ·) = 0 shows:
wiGi
∣∣
Gi=BiA
= −K0Z
i
wKφ
i
Gi
+ Zi
wGi
Ziww
= − ψ
i
w
ciwwZ
i + ψiwwG
i
> 0. (A.1)
Since ψiw > 0, the concavity of the unit cost functions in factor prices (i.e., c
i
ww, ψ
i
ww < 0)
implies, in turn, that an increase in Gi in the neighborhood of BiA increases the country’s
market-clearing (relative) wage, regardless of factor intensities.
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Differentiating (11) with respect to Gi, after simplifying and using (A.1), shows
∂2V iA
(∂Gi)2
∣∣∣∣
Gi=BiA
=
miA
ci
[
riK0φ
i
GiGi +
(
ψiw
)2
ciwwZ
i + ψiwwG
i
]
< 0, (A.2)
where we now define miA ≡ m(piA). The negative sign of (A.2) follows from the concavity of
the conflict technology in Gi (i.e., φi
GiGi
< 0) and equation (A.1). The strict quasi-concavity
of V iA in G
i, in turn, implies the existence of an interior equilibrium.
Uniqueness. To prove uniqueness of equilibrium, it suffices to show that
|J | ≡ ∂
2V iA
(∂Gi)2
∂2V jA
(∂Gj)2
− ∂
2V iA
∂Gi∂Gj
∂2V jA
∂Gj∂Gi
> 0, (A.3)
at any equilibrium point or, equivalently,
∂BiA
∂Gj
∂BjA
∂Gi
< 1, where
∂BiA
∂Gj
= − ∂
2V iA
∂Gi∂Gj
/
∂2V iA
(∂Gi)2
for i 6= j = 1, 2.
From the existence part of this proof, the sign of ∂BiA/∂G
j is determined by the sign of
∂2V iA/∂G
i∂Gj . To proceed, apply the implicit function theorem to Ziω(ω
i, ·) = 0 to find
wiGj
∣∣
Gi=BiA
= −K0Z
i
wKφ
i
Gj
Ziww
= − r
iK0φ
i
Gj
ciw
ci(ciwwZ
i + ψiwwG
i)
< 0, (A.4)
where the negative sign follows from the facts that ciw > 0, c
i
ww, ψ
i
ww < 0, and φ
i
Gj
< 0.
Differentiating (11) with respect to Gj , while using (A.4), gives
∂2V iA
∂Gi∂Gj
∣∣∣∣
Gi=BiA
=
miA
ci
[
riK0φ
i
GiGj +
riK0φ
i
Gj
ciwψ
i
w
ci(ciwwZ
i + ψiwwG
i)
]
. (A.5)
The second term inside the square brackets is positive by (A.4). From (5), the first term
is non-negative for all BiA(G
j) ≥ Gj , implying that the expression above is positive, and
thus Gi depends positively on Gj . But, Gi will depend negatively on Gj , if BiA(G
j) is
sufficiently smaller than Gj . Thus, depending on fundamentals, two possibilities arise: (i)
∂BiA/∂G
j < 0 and ∂BjA/∂G
i ≥ 0 for i 6= j = 1, 2; or (ii) ∂BiA/∂Gj > 0 for both i 6= j = 1, 2.
However, |J | > 0 in case (i). Hence, we need to consider only case (ii).
As in Jones (1965), denote the cost shares of Ki and Li in producing Zi respectively by
θiKZ ≡ ricir/ci and θiLZ ≡ wiciw/ci. Similarly let θiKG ≡ riψir/ψi and θiLG ≡ wiψiw/ψi denote
the corresponding cost shares in the production of Gi. In addition, let σiZ ≡ ciciwr/ciwcir
and σiG ≡ ψiψiwr/ψiwψir be the elasticities of substitution between factor inputs in Zi and
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Gi respectively, and define
λi ≡ θ
i
LGψ
iGi
θiLGψ
iGiθiKGσ
i
G + θ
i
LZc
iZiθiKZσ
i
Z
> 0. (A.6)
Applying the above definitions and country i’s FOC (11), while using the linear homogeneity
of ci and ψi, allows us to rewrite (A.2) and (A.5) respectively as
∂2V iA
(∂Gi)2
∣∣∣∣
Gi=BiA
= −m
i
Aψ
iφi
Gi
ciφi
[
−φ
iφi
GiGi
φi
Gi
φi
Gi
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLG
]
(A.7a)
∂2V iA
∂Gi∂Gj
∣∣∣∣
Gi=BiA
= −m
i
Aψ
iφi
Gj
ciφi
[
−φ
iφi
GiGj
φi
Gi
φi
Gj
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ
]
. (A.7b)
Combining these equations gives ∂BiA/∂G
j = (−φi
Gj
/φi
Gi
)H i, where
H i ≡ H
i
1
H i2
≡
[
−φ
iφi
GiGj
φi
Gi
φi
Gj
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ
]/[
−φ
iφi
GiGi
φi
Gi
φi
Gi
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLG
]
. (A.8)
Since (−φi
Gj
/φi
Gi
)(−φj
Gi
/φj
Gj
) = 1, we have (∂BiA/∂G
j)(∂BjA/∂G
i) = H iHj . Given our
focus on the case of strategic complements (which implies H i > 0 for i = 1, 2), proving
|J | > 0 requires only that H i < 1. In Supplementary Appendix B.1, we show that a
sufficient (but hardly necessary) condition is that σiG and/or σ
i
Z are large enough. ||
Proof of Proposition 2. In the absence of trade costs, country i’s TOT coincides with
its domestic relative price piT , where p
i
T ∈
[
1/αj , αi
]
. Our proof to follow abstracts from
the boundary conditions on piT . As such, it demonstrates the existence only of a local
optimum for each country i, given Gj .66 In Supplementary Appendix B.1, we return to
this issue, to show how weak comparative advantage (i.e., low values of αi) matters and
identify the existence of a critical value of αi for each country i, denoted by αi0T (> 1), such
that αi > αi0T for both i ensures that the boundary constraints on p
i
T do not bind in the
equilibrium identified here.
Let V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) denote the unconstrained value function for country i under free trade
(i.e., abstracting from the limits on piT ), and recall our definition of G
i
, as the maximum
quantity of arms produced by country i using all of Ki and Li. Assuming both labor and
capital are essential in producing Zi, V˜ iT (G
i
, Gj) < V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) for all Gi < G
i
that imply
Zi > 0. Therefore, ∂V˜ iT /∂G
i < 0 for sufficiently large Gi ∈ [0, Gi]. If σ ≤ σi ≡ γj/ζj
evaluated at Gi = Gj = 0 so that the marginal benefit of arming is non-positive at Gi = 0,
66Our abstraction can be thought of as assuming that αi → ∞ for i = 1, 2, which effectively reduces
the model to one in which each country produces a nationally differentiated good, as in Armington (1969).
Although convenient for ruling out possible discontinuities in the best-response functions, this simplification
fails to capture the rich welfare implications we identify in our modified Ricardian model.
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the conflict technology (5) implies V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) reaches a peak in the domain [0, G
i
] at Gi = 0
for Gj ≥ 0.67 Alternatively, if σ > σi so that the marginal benefit of arming is strictly
positive at Gi = 0, then V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) reaches a peak in the interior of the domain. In
this case, equation (5) and the continuity of V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) in Gi imply the existence of an
unconstrained best-response function for country i (i.e., ignoring the constraints on piT ),
denoted by B˜iT (G
j), such that the FOC (13) holds with equality.
Without any loss of generality, assume that σ1 < σ2. Then, since the above holds true
for both countries i = 1, 2, we have three possibilities to consider:
(i) σ ≤ σ1, which implies ∂V˜ iT /∂Gi|Gi=0 < 0 for i = 1, 2;
(ii) σ ∈ (σ1, σ2] which implies ∂V˜ 1T /∂G1|G1=0 < 0, while ∂V˜ 2T /∂G2|G2=0 > 0;
(iii) σ > σ2, which implies ∂V˜ iT /∂G
i|Gi=0 > 0 for i = 1, 2.
In case (i), there exists an equilibrium where each country i chooses GiT = 0. Similarly,
GiT = 0 in case (ii) for country i that has ∂V˜
i
T /∂G
i < 0 at Gi = 0. By contrast, in case
(ii) for the other country j 6= i and in case (iii) for both countries i, the marginal net
benefit from producing arms, when evaluated at zero arming, is strictly positive. Hence,
to establish the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in security policies under trade
(G1T , G
2
T ) 6= (G1A, G2A), assuming that αi is arbitrarily large for both i, we need to prove
only that V˜ iT (G
i, Gj) is strictly quasi-concave in Gi for country i when ∂V˜ iT /∂G
i = 0 at
Gi = B˜iT (G
j) > 0 given Gj ≥ 0, in cases (ii) and (iii).68 We present this part of the proof
in Supplementary Appendix B.1. ||
Proof of Lemma 2. We decompose the payoff effects of a shift from autarky to free trade
into three parts. First, starting from the equilibrium under autarky, allow country j to
reduce its guns from GjA to G
j
T ≥ 0, and let Gi adjust along BiA(Gj), so that only the
strategic effect on country i’s payoff matters:
1
V iA
∂V iA
∂(−Gj)
∣∣∣∣
Gi=BiA(G
j)
= −dZ
i/dGj
Zi
> 0,
which implies V iA(B
i
A(G
j
T ), G
j
T ) > V
i
A(G
i
A, G
j
A). Second, consider the welfare effect of a
shift to trade, given Gi = BiA(G
j
T ) and G
j = GjT . From Lemma 1, such a shift implies a
non-negative welfare effect: V iT (B
i
A(G
j
T ), G
j
T ) ≥ V iA(BiA(GjT ), GjT ). Third, country i’s shift
to trade induces it to adjust its arming, from BiA(G
j) to BiT (G
j) given Gj = GjT ≥ 0. Since
this adjustment also produces a non-negative welfare effect, we have V iT (B
i
T (G
j
T ), G
j
T ) ≥
67As suggested in the main text, another local maximum for Gi ∈ (0, G) could exist.
68Note that, by the continuity of our specification of φi = φ(Gi, Gj) in (5) at G1 = G2 = 0, with an
appropriate parameterization of this conflict technology (e.g., in terms of the parameters δ and b for the
example shown in footnote 22), we can ensure that σ − γ2/ζ2 remains negative when evaluated at country
2’s best response to G1 = 0 for case (ii).
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V iT (B
i
A(G
j
T ), G
j
T ). Bringing these results together gives V
i
T (G
i
T , G
j
T ) > V
i
A(G
i
A, G
j
A) for
i 6= j = 1, 2. In words, each country’s gain with a shift to free trade exceeds that predicted
by models that abstract from conflict, as captured by the second part of the decomposition.
What remains to be shown is that each country i’s payoff under free trade is comparable
to its payoff under autarky for any given Gj ≥ 0. The proof of Proposition 2 establishes
this requirement is satisfied provided that αi is sufficiently large. Thus, we need to consider
only circumstances where the lower price constraint piT ≥ 1/αj binds for country i. Fix
Gj at some level, and suppose that piT = 1/α
j for some value of Gi—call it Gic. Because
the unconstrained optimal value of Gi level is less than Gic, we know that V˜
i
T and thus V
i
T
rise as Gi approaches Gic from above. But, V
i
T also rises as G
i approaches Gic from below,
since the optimal value of Gi at constant prices equals BiA(G
j) which exceeds Gic, given G
j .
Thus, V iT reaches a (kinked) peak at G
i
c. ||
Proof of Proposition 3. Here we focus on the sufficient (but not necessary) condition for
a shift from autarky to free trade to induce a decrease in arming by both countries—that
∂BiA/∂G
j > 0 in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium. Starting with the case of
complete symmetry where Li = L and Ki = K for i = 1, 2, suppose the two countries arm
identically, G1 = G2 > 0. Then, from (5), φi = 12 and thus K
i
Z = KZ for i = 1, 2. In turn,
(7) and (8) imply ωi = ω and Zi = Z for i = 1, 2. Finally, ci/ri and ψi/ri are identical across
countries. Taken together, these findings imply the FOCs under autarky (11) are identical
across countries. Thus, G1 = G2 > 0 represents a possible equilibrium. From Proposition
1, we know further that, provided labor and capital are sufficiently substitutable in the
production of the intermediate good and guns, the equilibrium GiA = GA > 0 for i = 1, 2 is
unique. Since φi
GiGj
= 0 in this case, (A.5) implies our sufficient condition is satisfied.
There exists, in addition, a set of initial distributions of secure resources (including,
but not limited to, the symmetric distribution) that similarly imply GiA = GA > 0 for
i = 1, 2. To see this, recall that kiZ ≡ KiZ/LiZ denotes country i’ residual capital-labor
ratio. Equation (7) shows that kiZ = c
i
r/c
i
w determines the equilibrium wage-rental ratio
ωiA, and consequently k
i
ZA = kZA and ω
i
A = ωA hold for i = 1, 2 under complete symmetry.
Now, fix each country’s guns production at GA and reallocate both labor and secure capital
from country 2 to country 1 such that dKi = kZAdL
i for i = 1, 2, so as to leave their
residual capital-labor ratios unchanged at kZA. (For future reference, denote the set of
the resulting distributions of secure resources by S0.) But, since kZA does not change by
assumption, ωA also remains unchanged. By the FOC under autarky (11), then, neither
country has an incentive to change its arming with the redistribution of labor and capital.
Thus, for asymmetric distributions of secure resources in S0, equilibrium arming under
autarky remains unchanged and equalized across countries. Accordingly, ∂BiA/∂G
j > 0
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continues to hold for i 6= j = 1, 2 in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium.69
Finally, we consider distributions adjacent to S0. Starting from any distribution of
secure resources in S0, transfer one unit of labor from country 2 to country 1. By Lemma
A.1(b) this sort of transfer for given arming choices increases the relative wage and thus the
marginal cost of arming in the donor country (2) and has the opposite effects in the recipient
country (1). Thus, by the FOC under autarky (11) along with the strict quasi-concavity
of payoffs under autarky demonstrated in the proof to Proposition 1, this transfer of labor
induces the recipient (with k1ZA ↓) to arm by more and the donor (with k2KA ↑) to arm
by less, implying G1A > G
2
A. The logic spelled out above, in turn, implies that country 1’s
best-response function continues to be positively sloped in the neighborhood of the autarkic
equilibrium. Furthermore, for small transfers of labor from country 2 to country 1, country
2’s best-response function also remains positively sloped. By continuity, then, ∂BiA/∂G
j > 0
continues to hold for i 6= j = 1, 2 and distributions adjacent to S0.70 Hence, provided that
the distribution of initial resource endowments across the two countries imply sufficiently
similar residual capital-labor ratios, GiT < G
i
A holds for i 6= j = 1, 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (14a) with τ̂ i = τ̂ j = t̂i = 0, one can easily verify that the
following shows country i’s incentive to arm under trade given his rival’s arming Gj :
∂V iT /∂G
i
V iT
=
(
1− ρi) dZi/dGi
Zi
+ ρi
dZj/dGi
Zj
,
where as previously defined, ρi ≡ (γij/ti∆)[
(
ti − 1) εi + 1]. Maintaining focus on the case
where σ > 1, we have ρi ∈ (0, 1). Next evaluate the above at the solution for arming by
country i under autarky, as implicitly defined by the FOC implied by (11) or equivalently
where dZi/dGi = 0. Since ρi > 0 and from (10b) we have dZj/dGi < 0, the above expression
evaluated at GiA given any feasible G
j is necessarily negative.71 ||
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemma 3 establishes each country’s best-response function
shifts inward under trade relative to its positioning under autarky. We also know, from
(A.5) and the conflict technology (5), that at most one country’s best-response function can
be negatively related to the rival’s arming in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium.
Thus, at most one country could choose to arm by more under trade than under autarky.
69Note that successive transfers of secure labor and capital resources from country 2 to country 1 within
S0 eventually imply σ− γ2/ζ2 < 0 and thus drive arming by both countries under free trade (effectively) to
zero. More generally, uneven distributions of secure resources in S0 imply that the two countries produce
different quantities of Zi, and such differences cause their FOC’s under trade (13) to differ in equilibrium,
such that G1T 6= G2T even though G1A = G2A.
70As one can verify, transfers of secure capital this time from country 1 to country 2, again starting from
any distribution of secure resources in S0, generate similar effects.
71Equations (B.17) and (B.18) in Supplementary Appendix B.2 show how the parameter ρi simplifies in
the cases of (i) non-tariff trade costs only and (ii) tariffs chosen non-cooperative and simultaneously with
security policies.
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Clearly, when neither country arms by more (i.e., GiT < G
i
A for i = 1, 2), aggregate
arming is lower under trade than under autarky. To establish that aggregate arming is
always lower under (possibly costly) trade than under autarky, then, we need only consider
the case where GiT < G
i
A for one country i ∈ {1, 2}, but GjT > GjA for the other country
j 6= i. This ranking necessarily implies ∂BiA/∂Gj > 0 for all Gj ≤ GjA while ∂BjA/∂Gi < 0
for Gi close to GiA. Supplementary Appendix B.1 shows these relationships, which arise
when one country i has a sufficiently larger amount of secure labor to land relative to its
rival j such that GiA > G
j
A, imply that ∂B
j
A/∂G
i + 1 > 0 holds for all (Gi, Gj).
Now, starting from any value of Gi0 on the downward sloping segment of country j’s
best-response function, fix the associated sum Gi0 + B
j
A(G
i
0) = G
i + Gj and consider a
marginal decrease in Gi. The result that ∂BjA/∂G
i + 1 > 0 at Gi = Gi0 implies the decrease
in Gi below Gi0 necessarily raises B
j
A by less than the increase in G
j needed to keep Gi+Gj
constant at Gi0 +B
j
A(G
i
0)—i.e., B
j
A(G
i) < Gj for Gi = Gi0 − , where  > 0. It then follows
that BjA(G
i) < GjA for any G
i < GiA and G
j such that Gi+Gj = GiA+G
j
A, which implies in
turn that Gi +BjA(G
i) < Gi +Gj = GiA +G
j
A. But, since B
j
T (G
i) < BjA(G
i), we must have
Gi + BjT (G
i) < GiA +G
j
A. Finally, let G
i = GiT , which implies G
i + BjT (G
i) = GiT +G
j
T <
GiA +G
j
A, thereby completing the proof. ||
Proof of Proposition 5. From(14), country i’s ( 6= j = 1, 2) FOC for an interior solution
with ti = tj = 1 can be written as:
dV iT /dG
i
V iT
=
(
1− γ
i
j
∆
)
dZi/dGi
Zi
+
(
γij
∆
)
dZj/dGi
Zj
= 0, (A.9)
where, as previously defined in (14), ∆ = εi + εj − 1 and σ > 1 implies ∆ > 1 > γij . Now
suppose that Gi = Gj and that the value of Gi uniquely satisfies (A.9). We ask how Gi
and Gj compare when τ i 6= τ j . Since Li = L and Ki = K for i = 1, 2, Gi = Gj implies
Zi = Zj , dZi/dGi = dZj/dGj > 0 and dZj/dGi = dZi/dGj < 0. Then, from (A.9),
sign
{
∂V jT /∂G
j |Gj=Gi
}
= sign{γij − γji } (A.10)
holds. This expression implies that, if for example γij > γ
j
i , then ∂V
j
T /∂G
j |Gj=Gi > 0 and
thus (provided, of course, ∂2V jT /∂(G
j)2 < 0), GjT > G
i
T holds.
To identify how differences in trade costs influence differences between γij and γ
j
i , observe
γij − γji =
(pjT )
σ−1 − (piT )σ−1
(1 + (piT )
σ−1)(1 + (pjT )σ−1)
,
which implies, given σ > 1, that γij R γ
j
i as p
i
T Q p
j
T . Using equation (B.13) from Supple-
mentary Appendix B.2 (assuming Ẑi = Ẑj = 0 as well as ti = tj = 1) with the arbitrage
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condition that pi = tiτ iqi, we can see how how trade costs influence equilibrium prices:
p̂iT =
(
1− ε
i − 1
∆
)
τ̂ i +
(
εj − 1
∆
)
τ̂ j . (A.11)
Given our maintained assumption that σ > 1, one can easily verify that εi > 1 and 1 −
εi−1
∆ (=
εj
∆ ) > 0. Thus, an exogenous increase in τ
i increases both piT and p
j
T .
To complete the proof, we need to verify τ i Q τ j implies piT Q p
j
T . To that end, let us
consider a set of trade costs for countries i and j, with τ i < τ j , that imply a certain price
piT . Observe from (A.11) that combinations of τ
i and τ j leaving piT unchanged satisfy
τ̂ j
τ̂ i
∣∣∣∣
p̂iT=0
= −1−
(
εi − 1) /∆
(εj − 1) /∆ = −
εj
εj − 1 < −1. (A.12)
This expression implies that, as τ i rises, τ j must fall by a larger proportion to ensure that
piT remains unchanged. Turning to p
j
T , equation (A.11) implies
p̂jT =
(
εi
∆
)
τ̂ j +
(
εi − 1
∆
)
τ̂ i.
We now ask how pjT changes as τ
i rises and τ j falls from their respective initial values to
maintain piT at its initial value. Solving for τˆ
j |p̂iT=0 from (A.12) and substituting that into
the expression immediately above, one can confirm
p̂jT
∣∣∣
p̂iT=0
=
(
εi
∆
)
τ̂ j
∣∣
p̂i=0
+
(
εi − 1
∆
)
τ̂ i = − 1
εj − 1 τ̂
i.
Thus, as τ i rises, pjT falls along the schedule of trade costs that ensures p
i
T remains constant.
But, as τ i rises and τ j falls to satisfy (A.12), we eventually reach the point where τ i = τ j
that implies piT = p
j
T . As such, the initial trade-cost values with τ
i < τ j must have implied
piT < p
j
T initially. More generally, we have τ
i Q τ j implies piT Q p
j
T and thus γ
i
j R γ
j
i ,
thereby with (A.10) completing the proof. ||
Proof of Proposition 6.
Part a. Let us focus on an interior equilibrium in security policies under free trade.72 Given
our assumption that the two contending countries are identical in all respects means that,
when Gi = G, Z1 = Z2, so that νi = 12 , w
i = w, ri = r, and ci = c for i = 1, 2. Assuming
72Establishing clean analytical conditions that ensure uniqueness generally for CES preferences is diffi-
cult. However, in the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, matters simplify nicely, and uniqueness does hold.
Moreover, numerical analysis assuming σ > 1 does not indicate the existence of multiple equilibria.
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σ > 1, the FOCs under trade (16) can be written as
sign
{
∂V iT
∂Gi
∣∣∣∣
Gi=G
}
= sign
{
ArK0φ
i
Gi |Gi=G − ψ
}
,
for i = 1, 2, where A = 1 + γ2/2σ1−γ2/2σ > 1, for σ < ∞. Recall that the FOC for country i’s
arming choice under autarky (11) requires dZi/dGi = 0 or equivalently rK0φ
i
Gi
|Gi=GA−ψ =
0. Since A > 1, the sign of the FOC under trade when evaluated at Gi = GA for i = 1, 2 is
strictly positive, thereby completing the proof.
Part b: To prove this part, we focus on cases where the strength of comparative advantage
(i.e., αi = ai2 > 1 for i = 1, 2) is sufficiently small to imply that world market-clearing price
is very close to, but less than, the autarky price, such that the gains from trade are very
small. Since the increased security costs implied by part (a) are independent of αi, they
can easily dwarf the small gains from trade. See Supplementary Appendix B.1 for details.
||
Proof of Proposition 7. In view of space constraints and the fact that the structure of this
proof is very similar to that of Proposition 5, we only sketch it out here. (Supplementary
Appendix B.2.4 provides details.) Following our previous strategy, we start with country
i’s FOC for an interior solution for Gi (i = 1, 2) in the presence of non-tariff trade costs:
dV iT /dG
i
V iT
=
(
1− ν
iγi2
∆
)
dZi/dGi
Zi
−
(
νjγi2
∆
)
dZj/dGi
Zj
= 0,
where νi represents country i’s import share of good 2 and ∆ = σ + (σ − 1)[−γ31 + νiγi1 +
νjγj1] > σ assuming σ > 1. Observe that, when trade costs exist, domestic prices of good
j differ across countries, such that expenditure shares for good 2 (γi2) and import shares
(νi) also differ across countries i, but we nonetheless have ∆ > νiγi2. Accordingly, since
dZj/dGi < 0 by (10b), an interior solution requires dZi/dGi < 0.
Recalling our assumption that the two adversaries are identical, suppose Gi = Gj , where
Gi uniquely satisfies the FOC above. Then, Zi = Zj , dZj/dGj = dZi/dGi, and dZj/dGi =
dZi/dGj . To identify the ranking of equilibrium arming across adversaries i = 1, 2 who
face different trade costs with friendly country i = 3, we evaluate sign{dV jT /dGj |Gj=Gi} for
τ j 6= τ i. Assuming ∂2V jT /∂(Gj)2 < 0 holds, a positive (negative) sign implies GjT > GiT
(GjT < G
i
T ). As established in the full proof, if country 3’s trade costs with countries
i = 1, 2 are identical (i.e., τ3i = τ
3
j ), then only differences in expenditures shares matter for
this calculation. More specifically, sign{dV jT /dGj |Gj=Gi} = sign{γj2 − γi2} = sign{τ i − τ j}
holds, thereby completing the proof. ||
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B Supplementary Appendix for “Arming in the Global Economy: The
Importance of Trade with Enemies and Friends.”
This supplementary appendix has three main sections. The first section (B.1) provides
a proof of Lemma A.1 and presents the more technical details of the proofs presented in
Appendix A. It also contains an additional proposition regarding the effects of the elasticity
of substitution on equilibrium arming in the case of complete symmetry and its proof. The
second section (B.2) extends the analysis to include trade costs, in support of the analysis in
Sections 4.2 and 5, and presents some details of the numerical analysis including additional
results; this section also includes a proof of Proposition 7. The final section (B.3) provides
additional details regarding the empirical analysis in Section 6.
B.1 Additional Technical Details
Proof of Lemma A.1. That the equilibrium wage-rental ratio ωi is independent of the
trade regime in place, for given gross endowments and guns, follows directly from the
equilibrium condition in (7).
To establish parts (a)–(e) of the lemma, let us temporarily omit country superscripts.
Recall that
Z(ω,Kg, Lg, G) =
wLg + rKg − ψG
c(w, r)
=
ωLg +Kg − ψ(ω, 1)G
c(ω, 1)
. (B.1)
Now differentiate Z with respect to w, Kg, Lg, and G to obtain the following (after some
algebra):1
∂Z
∂w
≡ Zw =
(rcw
c2
)
(Lg − ψwG)
[
cr
cw
− Kg − ψrG
Lg − ψwG
]
(B.2a)
∂Z
∂Kg
≡ ZK = r/c (B.2b)
∂Z
∂Lg
≡ ZL = w/c (B.2c)
∂Z
∂G
≡ ZG = −ψ/c. (B.2d)
Taking derivatives of the above expressions with respect to w shows
Zww = −(cwwZ + ψwwG)/c > 0 (B.3a)
ZKw = −rcw/c2 < 0 (B.3b)
ZLw = rcr/c
2 > 0 (B.3c)
ZGw = −ψwc− cwψ
c2
=
r(ψrcw − ψwcr)
c2
=
rψwcw
c2
(
ψr
ψw
− cr
cw
)
. (B.3d)
1We abstract here from the dependence of Kg on guns by treating gross factor endowments as exogenous;
however, we explicitly consider this dependence in our analysis of endogenous security policies.
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Part (a). As can be seen from (B.1), to trace the role of ω it is sufficient to consider the
impact of variations in w keeping r fixed in the background. The expression inside the last
set of square brackets in (B.2a) coincides with the domestic market-clearing condition (7)
that produces the solution for ω; therefore, Zw = 0 evaluated at the value of ω (ω
e) or,
equivalently, Zω(ω
e, ·) = 0. Thus, the first component of this part of the lemma follows from
(B.2a). The second component follows from the sign of the expression for Zww in (B.3a),
as implied by (8), (7), and the linear homogeneity of the unit costs functions ψ and c, as
well as their concavity in factor prices. That Ze is strictly quasi-convex in ω and minimized
at the equilibrium value implies that Ze is the envelope function of Z (ω, ·), which is useful
for establishing the remaining parts of the lemma and for our subsequent characterization
of equilibria in security policies.
Part (b). This part follows from the implicit function theorem applied to Zew = 0, while
using (B.3). The first two components conform to intuition that an increase in the relative
supply of one factor (capital or labor) decreases its relative price in factor markets. The last
component reveals that, if the technology for guns is labor intensive (i.e., cr/cw > ψr/ψw),
then, at constant factor prices, production of an additional gun will increase the demand
for labor relative to capital, thus forcing the wage-rental ratio to rise.
Parts (c)–(e). The proof of the first component of parts (c), (d) and (e) follows readily from
(B.2b)–(B.2d) with Zeω = 0 and the fact that dZ
e = Zeωdω
e+ZeKdKg+Z
e
LdLg+Z
e
GdG. The
strict concavity of Ze in, say, Kg can be proven as follows. First, observe that dZ
e/dKg =
Zeω(dω
e/dKg) + Z
e
K . Now differentiate this expression with respect to Kg to find
d2Ze
dK2g
= Zeωω
(
dωe
dKg
)2
+ 2ZeωK
dωe
dKg
+ Zeω
d2ωe
dK2g
+ ZeKK .
Since Zeω = 0, Z
e
KK = 0, and dω
e/dKg = −ZeωK/Zeωω, the expression above simplifies as
d2Ze
dK2g
= −(Z
e
ωK)
2
Zeωω
< 0,
giving us the desired result. The strict concavity of Ze in Lg and in G in parts (d) and (e)
respectively can be shown along the same lines. Parts (c) and (d) state that Ze is increasing
and strictly concave in the country’s gross factor endowments. Part (e) establishes that,
given Kg, Z
e is decreasing and strictly concave in G. ||
Proof of Proposition 1 continued. To derive the sufficient conditions for uniqueness of
the equilibrium in security policies under autarky as stated in the proposition, we demon-
strate that the expression for H i ≡ H i1/H i2 shown in equation (A.8) of Appendix A is less
than one. Because the numerator (H i1) and the denominator (H
i
2) are both positive, we can
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subtract the former from the latter to obtain
Ci = H i2 −H i1 = −
φiφi
GiGi
φi
Gi
φi
Gi
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLG −
(
−φ
iφi
GiGj
φi
Gi
φi
Gj
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ
)
.
If Ci > 0, then H i < 1 holds. The properties of φ(Gi, Gj) imply
−φ
iφi
GiGi
φi
Gi
φi
Gi
=
1
φj
[
2φi − f(G
i)f ′′(Gi)
f ′(Gi)f ′(Gi)
]
> 0 (since f ′′ ≤ 0)
−φ
iφi
GiGj
φi
Gi
φi
Gj
=
φi
φj
− 1.
Using the above observations in Ci after rearranging terms gives
Ci =
1
φj
[
φi − f(G
i)f ′′(Gi)
f ′(Gi)f ′(Gi)
]
+
[
1− φ
iλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ
]
+
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLG.
A sufficient (but hardly necessary) condition for Ci > 0 is that the expression inside the
second set of square brackets is non-negative. The definition of λi in (A.6) and the FOC
under autarky (11) together imply after tedious algebra
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ =
riφiK0λ
i
ψiGi
θiLZ =
θiLGθ
i
LZ
(
riφiK0
)
σiGθ
i
LGθ
i
KGψ
iGi + σiZθ
i
LZθ
i
KZc
iZi
=
θiLGθ
i
LZ
(
riφiK0
)
Υi + θiLGθ
i
KGψ
iGi + θiLZθ
i
KZc
iZi
, (B.4)
where Υi ≡ (σiG − 1)θiLGθiKGψiGi + (σiZ − 1)θiLZθiKZciZi. Solving for Gi and Zi from (6a)
and (6b) with the definitions of the cost shares gives:
ψiGi =
θiKZw
iLi − θiLZri
(
Ki + φiK0
)
θiKZ − θiKG
ciZi =
−θiKGwiLi + θiLGri
(
Ki + φiK0
)
θiKZ − θiKG
,
which together imply
θiLGθ
i
KGψ
iGi + θiLZθ
i
KZc
iZi = θiKGθ
i
KZw
iLi + θiLGθ
i
LZr
i
(
Ki + φiK0
)
.
Substitution of the above in (B.4) shows
φiλi
φi
Gi
Gi
θiLZ =
[
θiLGθ
i
LZr
i
(
Ki + φiK0
)
Υi + θiKGθ
i
KZw
iLi + θiLGθ
i
LZr
i (Ki + φiK0)
](
φiK0
Ki + φiK0
)
,
which is less than one, implying Ci > 0, H i < 1 and thus uniqueness of equilibrium under
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autarky, if Υi is not very negative. A sufficient condition is that σiG and/or σ
i
Z are not too
much smaller than one. ||
Proof of Proposition 2 continued.
Strict quasi-concavity of V˜ iT in G
i. To present this proof, we introduce more compact
notation. In particular, define F i ≡ Zi(KiZ , LiZ) and let F iGi ≡ dZi/dGi shown in (10a) and
F j
Gi
≡ dZj/dGi shown in (10b), for j 6= i = 1, 2, indicate the effects of a change in Gi on
those optimized values. Then, with equation (12), we can rewrite country i’s FOC under
trade, focusing on interior solutions, as follows:
∂V˜ iT
∂Gi
= V˜ iT
[
F i
Gi
F i
− γj
σ
(
F i
Gi
F i
− F
j
Gi
F j
)]
= 0, (B.6)
where F i
Gi
/F i − F j
Gi
/F j > 0 which implies F i
Gi
/F i > 0. Note from (4) that ∂piT /∂G
i =
(piT /σ)(F
i
Gi
/F i − F j
Gi
/F j) and recall ∂γij/∂p
i
j = −(1− γij)(σ− 1)(γij/pij). Differentiation of
the expression above evaluated at an interior solution yields:
∂2V˜ iT
(∂Gi)2
∣∣∣∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
= V˜ iT
{
(σ − 1) (1− γj)
γj
(
F iGi/F
i
)2
+
(
1− γj
σ
) [(
F iGiGi/F
i
)− (F iGi/F i)2]
+
(γj
σ
)[(
F j
GiGi
/F j
)
−
(
F j
Gi
/F j
)2]}
. (B.7)
To evaluate the sign of this expression, we apply the implicit function theorem to Ziω(ω
i, ·) =
0, using equations (B.3) and (10) with F i ≡ Zi and (as before) attributing any implied
changes in ωi to changes in wi alone:
wiGi
∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
= −K0Z
i
wKφ
i
Gi
+ Zi
wGi
Ziww
= − c
i
wF
i
Gi
+ ψiw
ciwwF
i + ψiwwG
i
> 0
wj
Gi
∣∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
= −K0Z
j
wKφ
i
Gi
Zjww
= − c
j
wF
j
Gi
cjwwF j + ψ
j
wwGj
< 0.
With these expressions, one can verify the following:
F iGiGi
∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
=
1
ci
[
riK0φ
i
GiGi +
(
ciwF
i
Gi
+ ψiw
)2
ciwwF
i + ψiwwG
i
]
< 0
F j
GiGi
∣∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
=
1
cj
rjK0φjGiGi +
(
cjwF
j
Gi
)2
cjwwF j + ψ
j
wwGj
 .
Then, substitute the above into (B.7) and invoke the FOC under free trade (B.6), using the
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fact that φi
Gi
= −φj
Gi
. After rearranging, we have
∂2V˜ iT
(∂Gi)2
∣∣∣∣∣
Gi=B˜iT
= V˜ iT
{
−
[
1− γj + (σ − 1) γj
γj
]
(F iGi/F
i)2
+
(
1− γj/σ
ciF i
)
φi
GiGi
ψi
φi
Gi
+
(
1− γj/σ
ciF i
)
(ciwF
i
Gi
+ ψiw)
2
ciwwF
i + ψiwwG
i
+
(
γj/σ
cjF j
)
(cjwF
j
Gi
)2
cjwwF j + ψ
j
wwGj
}
< 0. (B.8)
The negative sign follows from our assumptions that σ > γj (to ensure that the marginal
cost of arming is strictly positive) and φi
GiGi
, ciww, ψ
i
ww < 0.
Sufficiently strong comparative advantage. We now turn to the condition in the proposition
that αi is sufficiently large. As noted earlier, for any given Gj , country i’s choice of guns
(Gi) influences its TOT and thus its imported good price piT (which equals the world relative
price in the absence of trade costs). However, this price cannot rise above the analogous
price in country i under autarky, piA = α
i; nor can it fall below the relative domestic price
of that good that prevails in country j, 1/pjA = 1/α
j . Thus, we have piT ∈
[
1/αj , αi
]
. In the
main text we refer to αi as the strength of country i’s comparative advantage in producing
good i. The smaller are αi and αj , the smaller is the range of prices within which country
i’s domestic price for its imported good can lie. This limited range, in turn, can lead to the
emergence of multiple peaks in each country’s payoff function given the opponent’s guns
choice that might generate discontinuities in best-response functions and, thus, can imply
the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Above, we analyzed the outcome in security policies (G1T , G
2
T ) based on the countries’
unconstrained best-response functions, B˜iT (G
j) i = 1, 2 that ignore these boundary condi-
tions. The requirement for (G1T , G
2
T ) to be an equilibrium point is that it belongs to both
countries’ constrained best-response functions, BiT (G
j) for i = 1, 2 that take into account
the boundaries on the feasible range for piT . The potential problem is that depending on
the value of αi, BiT (G
j) could consist of two segments in the neighborhood of GjT , one that
lies on BiA(G
j) and another that lies on B˜iT (G
j), as illustrated in Fig. B.1. Thus, whether
(G1T , G
2
T ) qualifies as a pure-strategy equilibrium or not hinges on the location of the dis-
continuity relative to GjT . We now show that location depends on the strength of the two
countries’ comparative advantage, αi for i = 1, 2.
To proceed, observe that, from (9) for J = A and the fact that piA = α
i, we can
write V iA(G
i, Gj) = V iA(G
i, Gj ;αi), where ∂V iA/∂α
i < 0; and, similarly from (9) for J = T ,
we can write V˜ iT
(
Gi, Gj
)
= V iT
(
piT
(
Gi, Gj
)
, Gi, Gj
)
, which gives us country i’s payoff
under trade when it accounts for the TOT effect, without imposing the constraint that
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piT ≤ αi. Note especially that the strength of comparative advantage αi has no direct effect
on unconstrained payoffs under trade, ∂V˜ iT /∂α
i = 0.
Now consider a feasible value of Gj , and the following two values of αi for country i
associated with that level of arming by the rival:
(i) αi ≡ piT (B˜iT
(
Gj
)
, Gj) denotes the value of αi for which, given Gj , the TOT effect of
country i’s arming just vanishes, such that
V iA(B˜
i
T (G
j), Gj ;αi) = V˜ iT (B˜
i
T
(
Gj
)
, Gj);
(ii) αi ≡ piT (BiA(Gj), Gj) denotes the value of αi that, given Gj , makes country i’s payoff
under autarky just equal to its payoff under trade if it were to operate along BiA,
ignoring the TOT effect of its arming decision:
V˜ iT
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj
)
= V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
.
Observe that ∂piT /∂G
i > 0 for any Gi < BiA(G
j). In addition, comparing the FOC under
autarky (11) with the FOC under trade (13) shows that B˜iT
(
Gj
)
< BiA(G
j) for any feasible
Gj . Thus, we have αi < αi. Furthermore, since ∂V iA/∂α
i < 0, V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
>
V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
holds. Moreover, we have
V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
> V˜ iT
(
B˜iT
(
Gj
)
, Gj
)
> V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
.
The definition of αi and the fact that V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi
)
> V iA(B˜
i
T (G
j), Gj ;αi) give the
first inequality. Intuitively, when αi = αi ≡ piT (B˜iT
(
Gj
)
, Gj), prices are fixed, and country
i enjoys no gains from trade; thus, country i can obtain a larger payoff under autarky
by expanding Gi all the way to its its best-response level, BiA(G
j). The validity of the
second inequality follows from the definition of αi and the fact that V˜ iT (B˜
i
T
(
Gj), Gj
)
>
V˜ iT
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj
)
. When αi = αi ≡ piT (BiA(Gj), Gj), country i can improve its payoff by
operating on its best-response function under trade, B˜iT
(
Gj
)
, which takes into account the
TOT effect of arming. Since V iA is continuously decreasing in α
i, there exists a value of αi,
αi0 ∈ (αi, αi), that solves
V iA
(
BiA
(
Gj
)
, Gj ;αi0
)
= V˜ iT
(
B˜iT
(
Gj
)
, Gj
)
.
Note that this value of αi0 generally depends on G
j . Furthermore, there exist combinations
of Gi and Gj such that piT (G
i, Gj) = αi0.
Let Λi
(
Gj , αi
)
denote the difference in payoffs when country i operates on B˜iT (G
j) and
when it operates on BiA(G
j) given αi and Gj , for i 6= j = 1, 2:
Λi
(
Gj , αi
) ≡ V˜ iT (B˜iT (Gj) , Gj)− V iA (BiA (Gj) , Gj ;αi) .
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This function helps pin down possible discontinuities in player i’s constrained best-response
function under free trade, BiT
(
Gj ;αi
)
, and clarifies their dependence on αi. For any given
Gj and αi, we have
BiT (G
j ;αi) =
{
B˜iT (G
j) if Λi
(
Gj , αi
) ≥ 0
BiA(G
j) if Λi
(
Gj , αi
) ≤ 0.
Since ∂V iA/∂α
i < 0 and V˜ iT is independent of α
i, ∂Λi/∂αi ≡ Λi
αi
> 0. Of course, the sign
of Λi
(
Gj , αi
)
also depends on Gj . With the envelope theorem, the negative externality
that the rival’s arming confers on country i implies ∂V˜ iT /∂G
j < 0 and ∂V iA/∂G
j < 0 for
feasible Gj . Thus, unless we impose additional structure on the model, we cannot sign
∂Λi/∂Gj ≡ Λi
Gj
. Λi
(
Gj , αi
)
could change signs (positive to negative or vice versa) or not
change at all as Gj changes. This last possibility means that the equality Λi
(
Gj , αi0
)
= 0
need not imply BiT (·) is discontinuous at Gj given αi = αi0.2
Nevertheless, assuming Λi
Gj
6= 0 so that Λi (Gj , αi0) = 0 does imply a discontinuity
in BiT (G
j), we can be more precise about how values of αi for i = 1, 2 matter for the
existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium under trade. Suppose Gj = GjT , and find the
value of αi (denoted by αi0T ) that implies Λ
i(GjT , α
i
0T ) = 0. Since Λ
i
αi
> 0, we know that
Λi(GjT , α
i) > 0 for all αi > αi0T at G
j = GjT . Furthermore, for α
i = αi0T , a marginal
increase in Gj above GjT implies Λ
i(Gj , αi) ≷ 0 as Λi
Gj
≷ 0. When αi rises marginally
above αi0T , the value of G
j that restores the equality Λi(Gj , αi) = 0 will change according
to dGj/dαi|Λi=0 = −Λiαi/ΛiGj : dGj/dαi|Λi=0 ≶ 0 iff ΛiGj ≷ 0.
To see the implications of these observations, suppose that Λi
Gj
> 0 in the neighborhood
of GjT , which implies Λ
i(Gj , αi0T ) > 0 for G
j marginally above GjT , as illustrated in Fig.
B.1.3 In this case, a small increase in αi above αi0T implies not only Λ(α
i, GjT ) > 0 at G
j
T ,
but also the value of Gj that restores the equality Λ(αi, Gj) = 0 falls. Thus, BiT (G
j) shifts
back from BiA(G
j) to B˜iT (G
j) for values of Gj just below GjT given values of α
i just above
αi0T , such that B
i
T (G
j) = B˜iT (G
j) over a larger range of Gj in the neighborhood of GjT .
Alternatively, when Λi
Gj
< 0 so that Λi(Gj , αi0T ) > 0 for G
j just below GiT , the marginal
increase in αi above αi0T implies that the point of discontinuity is above G
j
T . Then, for
values of Gj just above GjT , B
i
T (G
j) shifts back from BiA(G
j) to B˜iT (G
j). As such, the
2For a given combination of αi = αi0 and G
j that implies Λi
(
Gj , αi
)
= 0, it is possible that ΛiGj = 0
for values of Gj in the neighborhood of that point of indifference, in which case country i would remain
indifferent between trade and autarky in that neighborhood. Furthermore, it is possible that country i favors
trade for all other possible values in Gj , or alternatively that it favors autarky for all other possible values
of Gj . Although we cannot rule out such possibilities, we view them as highly unlikely, and focus on cases
where ΛiGj 6= 0.
3Thus, for Gj above the point of discontinuity (GjT ), B
i
T (G
j) = B˜iT (G
j); and for Gj < GjT , B
i
T (G
j) =
BiA(G
j). In the case that ΛiGi < 0, B
i
T (G
j) = B˜iT (G
j) for Gj below the discontinuity and BiT (G
j) = BiA(G
j)
for points above it.
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marginal increase in αi implies once again that the range of Gjs in the neighborhood of
GjT for which B
i
T (G
j) = B˜iT
(
Gj
)
expands. Thus, the larger is the degree of comparative
advantage αi for country i relative to αi0T , the more likely it is that B˜
i
T (G
j
T ) ∈ BiT (GjT ).
Since this is true for both i, (G1T , G
2
T ) will be an equilibrium point under trade if α
i > αi0T
for both i.4 ||
Proposition B.1 (Equilibrium arming and the elasticity of substitution under complete
symmetry.) Suppose the conditions of complete symmetry are satisfied and that labor and
capital are sufficiently substitutable in the production of arms and/or the intermediate
good. Furthermore, assume that each country’s comparative advantage (αi) is sufficiently
strong. Then, an increase in the elasticity of substitution in consumption σ > 1 induces
greater arming under trade (i.e., dGT /dσ > 0). As σ approaches ∞, equilibrium arming
under trade approaches equilibrium arming under autarky (i.e., limσ→∞GT = GA).
Proof: The implications of complete symmetry for any given trade regime as detailed in
the proof of Proposition 3 (in Appendix A) together with the assumption that σ > 1 allow
us to write the FOC under trade (13) evaluated at Gi = GT > 0 as
1
miT
∂V iT
∂Gi
=
1
c
[(
1− 1
σ
)
rK0φ
i
Gi
∣∣
Gi=GT
−
(
1− 1
2σ
)
ψ
]
= 0,
where we again introduce more compact notation miT ≡ m(piT ). Factoring out 1 − 1/2σ
from the RHS allows us to rewrite this condition as
Ωi(GT , σ) = ArK0φ
i
Gi
∣∣
Gi=GT
− ψ = 0,
where now A = (σ − 1)/(σ − 12) ∈ (0, 1). A comparison of the expression above with
the analogous condition under autarky in (11) after imposing the conditions of complete
symmetry GiA = GA (i.e., rK0φ
i
Gi
∣∣
Gi=GA
−ψ = 0) reveals the conditions that guarantee the
existence of a unique, symmetric equilibrium in security policies under autarky (GA > 0
for all σ > 0) also imply ΩiG < 0; thus, provided comparative advantage is sufficiently
strong, these conditions guarantee the existence of a unique, symmetric equilibrium under
free trade: GT > 0 for all σ > 1.
5 What’s more, since A < 1 for σ ∈ (1,∞), we have
GT ∈ (0, GA). Our claim in the proposition that GT is increasing in σ (for σ > 1) follows
immediately since A is independent of the common level of guns and is increasing in σ. To
verify the limit part of the proof, observe that limσ→∞A = 1. ||
Proof of Proposition 4 continued. Here, we demonstrate that ∂BjA/∂G
i + 1 > 0 holds
4If αi < αi0T , G
i
T 6= G˜iT and the equilibrium under free trade will involve mixed strategies and/or it will
coincide with autarky.
5This finding also holds in the presence of symmetric trade costs.
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for all (Gi, Gj) that satisfy ∂BjA/∂G
i < 0 and ∂BiA/∂G
j > 0. To this end, first recall from
the proof of Proposition 1 that ∂BiA/∂G
j = (−φi
Gj
/φi
Gi
)H i, where H i is given by (A.8).
Economizing on notation, let Φ ≡ φjλ
φj
Gj
Gj
> 0, x ≡ θjLZ > 0 and y ≡ θjLG > 0. Using these
definitions and the specification of φi in (5), we have
∂BjA
∂Gi
=
(
−φ
j
Gi
φj
Gj
)−
φjφj
GjGi
φj
Gi
φj
Gj
+ Φx
−φ
jφj
GjGj
φj
Gj
φj
Gj
+ Φy
 = [f(Gj)f ′(Gi)f(Gi)f ′(Gj)
] f(Gj)f(Gi) + Φx− 1
2f(G
j)
f(Gi)
− f(Gj)f ′′(Gj)
(f ′(Gj))2φi + Φy
 ,
where f(·) > 0, f ′(·) and f ′′(·) ≤ 0. Focusing on the second expression on the RHS, observe
that the denominator of the second (multiplicative) term is positive. Thus, the sign of
∂BjA/∂G
i + 1 coincides with the sign of the following
C =
[
f
(
Gj
)
f ′
(
Gi
)
f (Gi) f ′ (Gj)
][
f
(
Gj
)
f (Gi)
+ Φx− 1
]
+ 2
f
(
Gj
)
f (Gi)
− f
(
Gj
)
f ′′
(
Gj
)
(f ′ (Gj))2 φi
+ Φy
=
f
(
Gj
)
f (Gi)
[
2− f
′ (Gi)
f ′ (Gj)
]
+
[
f
(
Gj
)
f ′
(
Gi
)
f (Gi) f ′ (Gj)
][
f
(
Gj
)
f (Gi)
+ Φx
]
+ Φy − f
(
Gj
)
f ′′
(
Gj
)
(f ′ (Gj))2 φi
.
The last two terms of the second line are non-negative. Furthermore, the assumptions that
f ′′ < 0 and Gi > Gj together imply f ′(Gi)/f ′(Gj) ≤ 1. Thus, C > 0, thereby completing
the proof. ||
Proof of Proposition 6 continued. The proof of part (b) of the proposition builds
on the feature of the model that, as in the analysis with only two countries, the world
price is bounded by the two autarky prices: pT ∈ [1/p3A, pA]. To keep matters simple but
without loss of generality, we suppose that a11 = a
2
1 = a
3
2 = 1 and a
1
2 = a
2
2 = a
3
1 = α > 1,
so that countries 1 and 2 have an identical comparative advantage in the production of
good 1, whereas country 3 has a comparative advantage in the production of good 2; and,
furthermore, comparative advantage is symmetric across countries 1 and 2 on the one hand
and country 3 on the other, with α > 1 indicating the strength of that advantage. Given
these simplifications, piA = α for i = 1, 2, 3. To simplify a little more, suppose in addition
that preferences are Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1).6 Then, the condition of balanced trade implies
pT =

1/α if pi ≤ 1/α
pi if 1/α < pi < α
α if α ≤ pi,
where pi ≡ γ2γ1
[
Z1+Z2
Z3
]
. Since the expenditure shares (γ1 = 1 − γ2 for all three countries)
6The analysis does not change substantively if we allow σ > 1. In any case, note that we are not restricting
preferences here to be symmetrically defined across the two goods.
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are constant, the expression above shows that pT remains fixed for combinations of Z
1 and
Z2 that imply (given Z3) a constant sum Z1 + Z2.
We assume further (for clarity) that guns are produced with labor only (so that ψi = wi),
which implies that Zi = Z(L−Gi,K+φiK0), where Z(·) now represents a standard constant
returns to scale production function that gives the output of the intermediate good Zi.7
Then, the relevant upper bound on the world price can be written as∑
i=1,2
Zi =
∑
i=1,2
Z(L−Gi,K + φiK0) = γ1
γ2
αZ3 ≡ Z,
which defines combinations of guns such that pT = α.
8 This constraint is depicted in
Fig. B.2, which also shows country 1’s best-response function under autarky B1A(G
2) and
its best-response function under free trade that ignores the constraint on pT , B˜
1
T (G
2).9
Combinations of guns above the pT = α constraint imply pT < α, whereas combinations on
and below the constraint imply pT = α (or equivalently
∑
i=1,2 Z
i ≥ Z). Starting at points
where the constraint binds, changes in guns by either country would cause pT to fall only
if the new point is beyond the pT = α constraint.
The shape of this constraint, as shown in the figure, has three key properties:
(i) The constraint has a slope of −1 where it intersects the 45o line, as can be confirmed
by evaluating dG2/dG1|pT=α at G2 = G1.
(ii) It is not possible for both G1 and G2 to increase as we move rightward along the
constraint away from the 45o line towards B˜1T (G
2).10
(iii) The properties above in turn imply that the pT = α constraint must intersect (or
approach) B˜1T (G
2) at some point C ′ below and to the right of its intersection with the
45o line.11
Larger values of α imply that the pT = α constraint lies closer to the origin, without
7The assumption that guns are produced with labor alone is not crucial, but simplifies the analysis.
8A similar constraint can be written for the lower bound of pT = 1/α:
∑
i=1,2 Z
i = Z3γ1/(γ2α) ≡ Z,
with Z < Z. However, it is the upper bound that is relevant here.
9That B1A(G
2) < B˜1T (G
2) for given G2 reflects the effect of trade to augment a country’s incentive to arm
against another country when the two compete in the same export market, as emphasized in the text.
10This property follows from the effects of changes in arming on
∑
i=1,2 Z
i. Starting at the point where
the pT = α constraint intersects B
1
A(G
2) in Fig. B.2, let G1 rise while keeping G2 fixed. The FOC under
autarky (11) implies ∂V 1A/∂G
1 < 0 for G1 > B1A(G
2), so that dZ1/dG1 < 0; since dZ2/dG1 < 0 holds too,
the increase in G1 causes
∑
i=1,2 Z
i and thus pT to fall, implying that the new combination of guns is above
the pT = α constraint. Repeated applications of this logic establish that G
1 and G2 cannot both increase
as we continue to move along the constraint approaching B˜1T (G
2)). That is to say, the pT = α constraint
cannot be U -shaped to the right of the 45o line. However, it is possible that dG2/dG1|pT=α →∞ somewhere
along the constraint as we move further towards or beyond B˜1T (G
2)—a possibility illustrated in Fig. B.2.
There exist no combinations of G1 and G2 beyond this critical point, whether it is located to the left or
right of B˜1T (G
2), where the price constraint binds.
11C′ can be arbitrarily close to point 0, but that does not matter for our argument to follow.
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affecting the positioning of B1A(G
2) and B˜1T (G
2).12
Now consider the value ofG2 denoted byG2C such thatG
1
A = B
1
A(G
2
C) implies
∑
i=1,2 Z
i >
Z and, more importantly, such that G1T = B˜
1
T (G
2
C) implies
∑
i=1,2 Z
i = Z. For G2 = G2C , a
shift from autarky to free trade (shown in Fig. B.2 as a movement from point C to point C ′)
implies pT = pA = α. With no gains from trade given G
2 = G2C , country 1 prefers to stay
on its best-response function under autarky that simply maximizes its output of Z1. That
is to say, V 1A(B
1
A(G
2
C), G
2
C) > V˜
1
T (B˜
1
T (G
2
C), G
2
C). Next consider a larger value of G
2 denoted
by G2D such that G
1
A = B
1
A(G
2
D) implies
∑
i=1,2 Z
i = Z and furthermore G1T = B˜
1
T (G
2
D)
implies
∑
i=1,2 Z
i < Z. In this case as shown in Fig. B.2, a shift from autarky to free
trade implies pT < α and induces country 1 to increase its arming in a move from BA(G
2
D)
(point D) to B˜T (G
2
D) (point D
′), with V˜ 1T (B˜
1
T (G
2
D), G
2
D) > V
1
A(B
1
A(G
2
D), G
2
D). By conti-
nuity, there exists a value of arming by country 2, denoted by G20 ∈ (G2C , G2D), such that
V 1A(B
1
A(G
2
0), G
2
0) = V˜
1
T (B˜
1
T (G
2
0), G
2
0). This value of G
2
0 defines the discontinuity in country
1’s best-response function under (free) trade, denoted by B1T (G
2):
B1T (G
2) =
{
B1A(G
2) if G2 ≤ G20;
B˜1T (G
2) if G2 ≥ G20.
Since the location of the pT = α constraint depends on α (moving closer to the origin as α
increases), the location of the discontinuity depends on α as well.
We flesh out the possible welfare implications here, with the help of Fig. B.2. Point
A on the 45o line where the best-response functions of the two (identical) countries under
autarky would cross (so that G1A = G
2
A = GA) represents the unique, symmetric equilibrium
under autarky. Point T also on the 45o line shows where the unconstrained best-response
functions under trade would cross so that G1T = G
2
T = GT . Provided T lies above the
pT = α constraint, it represents an equilibrium under free trade. A movement along the
45o line from A to T implies no change in the distribution of K0, but higher security costs.
How these added security costs compare with the gains from trade depends on the location
of the discontinuity of the constrained best-response function under trade, B1T (G
2).
Suppose that the discontinuity occurs atG20 = GA, depicted as pointA. By the definition
of the discontinuity, the payoffs to country 1 under autarky and trade will be equal at this
level of arming by country 2: V 1A(B
1
A(GA), GA) = V˜
1
T (B˜
1
T (GA) , GA). We now show that a
movement along B˜1T (G
2) from (B˜1T (GA), GA) in the direction of point T reduces country 1’s
payoff in the 3-country case. By the envelope theorem, since we are moving along country
1’s best-response function under trade, we need only to consider the welfare effects of a
12The pT = α constraint likewise moves closer to the origin when either Z
3 or γ1 = 1− γ2 increases, but
such changes could also affect the positioning of B˜1T (G
2). Focusing on how the positioning of the pT = α
constraint depends on α allows us to show most clearly how the price constraint relates to the location of
the discontinuity of the best-response function under free trade as derived below.
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change in G2 as it influences country 1’s optimal production of the intermediate input and
pT . Keeping in mind the effects of a change in G
2 on both countries’ optimizing production,
dZ1/dG2 and dZ2/dG2 shown in (10), we use (15) with ∆ = σ = 1 and rearrange to find:
1
V 1T
∂V 1T
∂G2
=
[
1− ν1γ2
] dZ1/dG2
Z1
− [ν2γ2]dZ
2/dG2
Z2
. (B.9)
To evaluate the sign of (B.9), observe that, for points on B1T
(
G2
)
where G2 < B2T
(
G1
)
,
the net marginal benefit of arming for country 2 is positive:
1
V 2T
∂V 2T
∂G2
= [1− ν2γ2]dZ
2/dG2
Z2
− [ν1γ2]dZ
1/dG2
Z1
> 0.
This inequality can be rewritten as
−[ν2γ2]dZ
2/dG2
Z2
< −
[
ν1ν2 (γ2)
2
1− ν2γ2
]
dZ1/dG2
Z1
,
and then combined with (B.9) (using the fact that ν1 + ν2 = 1) to find
1
V 1T
∂V 1T
∂G2
<
[
1− γ2
1− ν2γ2
]
dZ1/dG2
Z1
.
Since ν2, γ2 < 1 and dZ
1/dG2 < 0, the RHS of the expression above is negative, which in
turn implies that ∂V 1T /∂G
2 < 0.13 As such, VT (GT , GT ) < VA(GA, GA) when G
2 = GA.
By continuity, there exist higher values of α (with the pT = α constraint and the
discontinuity in B1F (G
2) moving towards the origin), such that the gains from trade continue
to be less than the higher security costs under trade, implying that a shift from autarky to
free trade is welfare reducing. Of course, increases in the strength of comparative advantage
eventually imply sufficiently large gains from trade that swamp the higher security costs
and thus render free-trade Pareto preferred to autarky.14 ||
13A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this result to hold more generally under CES preferences
is that σ ≥ 1.
14Note that for smaller α, the discontinuity in B1T (G
2) moves between points A and T . In such cases,
both points A and T represent pure-strategy equilibria, with autarky being Pareto preferred to free trade.
For α sufficiently small to push the pT = α constraint beyond point T , the only pure-strategy equilibrium
is autarky.
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Figure B.1: Derivation of Best-Response Function under Trade and Nash Equilibria in
Security Policies in the Two-Country Case
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Figure B.2: Derivation of Best-Response Function under Free Trade and Comparison of
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B.2 Trade Costs
This part of the supplementary appendix focuses on the implications of trade costs in both
the two-country setting (in the first three sections) and in the three-country setting.
B.2.1 Introducing Trade Costs between Adversarial Countries
Trade in world markets can be costly first due to the possible existence of geographic or
physical trade barriers that take Samuelson’s “iceberg” form. In particular, for each unit
of a final good that country i imports (and consumes), country j must ship τ i (≥ 1) units.
Trade across national borders might be costly also due to the existence of import tariffs.
Denote country i’s (ad valorem) import tariff plus 1 by ti (≥ 1).15 Our analysis of trade
must be modified in two principal ways to account for trade costs. First, we need to
distinguish between domestic and world prices. Specifically, letting qj denote the “world”
price of good j, competitive pricing implies qj = p
j
j = c
j for j = 1, 2 and qi = qj/qi = c
j/ci.
But, the presence of trade costs drives a wedge between this world relative price and the
domestic relative price of that same good imported by country i, pi = pij/p
i
i. In particular,
piT = t
iτ iqiT , which implies p̂
i
T = t̂
i+τ̂ i+q̂iT . Hereafter, where feasible, we omit the subscript
“T” to avoid clutter.
Second, we must capture the presence of tariff revenues.16 Assume that each country
i specializes completely in producing the good i, so that its demand for good j is satisfied
entirely through imports: M i = Dij , where from (1) D
i
j = γ
i
jY
i/pij . Then,
Y i = ciZi + t
i−1
ti
pijD
i
j = c
iZi + t
i−1
ti
γijY
i =⇒ Y i = c
iZi
γii + γ
i
j/t
i
, i 6= j. (B.10)
Substitution of the second expression for Y i in (B.10) back into Dij gives
Dij =
γijZ
i/pi
γii + γ
i
j/t
i
, i 6= j = 1, 2. (B.11)
The (absolute value of the) uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticity of import demand
εi and the (absolute value of the) compensated (Hicksian) price elasticity of import demand
ηi can be computed respectively as follows:
εi ≡ −∂M
i/∂pi
M i/pi
= 1 + (σ − 1) t
iγii
tiγii + γ
i
j
(B.12a)
ηi ≡ − ∂M
i/∂pi
M i/pi
∣∣∣∣
dU i=0
= εi − γ
i
j
tiγii + γ
i
j
= σ
(
tiγii
tiγii + γ
i
j
)
> 0, (B.12b)
15We abstract from the possible existence of internal transportation costs and export taxes.
16We assume these revenues are distributed to consumers in a lump sum fashion.
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for i 6= j = 1, 2. Note that sign{εi − 1} = sign {σ − 1}.
Given countries specialize completely in the production of their respective exported
goods, world market clearing requires τ iqjD
i
j = τ
jqiD
j
i . Using (B.11) and the pricing
relations spelled out above, one can verify this condition implies:
qi
(
γijZ
i
tiγii + γ
i
j
)
=
γjiZ
j
tjγjj + γ
j
i
, i 6= j = 1, 2.
Thus, the world market-clearing price qi is implicitly defined as a function of security
policies and trade costs. In what follows, we assume this condition is satisfied for pi =
τ itiqi ∈ [1/αj , αi] for i 6= j = 1, 2, so as to abstract from the possible issues that can arise
in relation to discontinuities in the best-response functions. More to the point, assuming a
sufficiently large comparative advantage (αi) for each country i, given trade costs, allows us
to focus on the salient features of the trade equilibrium that involves strictly positive trade
flows and thus is distinct from the equilibrium under autarky.
Totally differentiating this expression and rearranging terms allows us to trace out the
effects of Zi, Zj , ti, tj , τ i and τ j on the market-clearing relative world price of country i’s
imported good, qi:
q̂i =
1
∆
[
Ẑi − Ẑj − ηit̂i + ηj t̂j − (εi − 1) τ̂ i + (εj − 1) τ̂ j] , (B.13)
where ηi and εi are shown in (B.12) and where we assume the Marshall-Lerner condition
for stability, given by ∆ ≡ εi + εj − 1 > 0, is satisfied. As expected, an increase (decrease)
in ti (tj) improves country i’s TOT. Furthermore, if σ > 1, then a change in τ i (τ j)
has a qualitatively similar effect on qi. The effects of changes in Zi and Zj on qi are as
expected. If the percentage increase in Zi (brought about by a change in, say, Gi) exceeds
the corresponding change in Zj , then i’s TOT will deteriorate.
B.2.2 Payoff Functions and the Incentive To Arm in the Two-Country Setting
The payoff functions under costly trade are central to characterizing the countries’ opti-
mizing choices of guns production. Recall we can write V i = µiY i, where µi is the inverse
of the price index, given by P i = pii[1 + (p
i)1−σ]1/(1−σ). Then, using the expression for
Y i = ciZi = piiZ
i shown in (B.10), we can rewrite the indirect utility function as
V i =
piiZ
i/P i
γii + γ
i
j/t
i
, i 6= j = 1, 2. (B.14)
Total differentiation of (B.14), with a focus on percentage changes, yields
V̂ i = Ẑi +
γij
tiγii + γ
i
j
t̂i − γ
i
j
ti
[
(ti − 1)εi + 1] (t̂i + τ̂ i + q̂i) . (B.15)
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Upon substituting the expression for q̂iT (B.13) into (B.15) and simplifying, one can verify
V̂ i =
(
1− ρi) Ẑi + ρiẐj − ρi [εj τ̂ i + (εj − 1) τ̂ j + ηj t̂j]
+
(
γij/t
i∆
)
ηi
[
1− (ti − 1) (εj − 1)] t̂i, (B.16)
for j 6= i = 1, 2, where ρi ≡ (γij/ti∆)[
(
ti − 1) εi + 1]. The first two terms in the first line
identify the effects of changes in Zi and Zj respectively. The next term in the first line
identifies the effects of changes in non-tariff trade costs for countries i and j and tariffs
imposed by country j. The term in the second line shows the effect of changes in tariffs
imposed by the country i. Observe especially that this formulation allows for asymmetric
trade costs across the two countries.
To explore how the presence of trade costs matters for arming incentives, we now consider
the effect of an increase in country i’s own guns Gi on its payoff. For example, if there are
non-tariff barriers (τ i > 1) but no tariffs (ti = 1 so that ρi = γij/∆), then (B.16) implies
the following net marginal benefit from arming for country i:
∂V iT /∂G
i
V iT
∣∣∣∣
ti=1
=
(
1− γ
i
j
∆
)
dZi/dGi
Zi
+
(
γij
∆
)
dZj/dGi
Zj
. (B.17)
Observe that this expression is similar to what we have under free trade, shown in (12), with
the only difference being the replacement of ∆ for σ.17 Alternatively, suppose each country
simultaneously chooses its tariff and security policies to maximize its payoff. From (B.16),
a necessary condition for i’s tariff to be optimal (given σ > 1) is that ti− 1 = 1/(εj − 1) for
i 6= j = 1, 2 or, equivalently, tio = εj/(εj − 1), which is the standard optimal tariff formula.
From the definition of ∆ ≡ εi + εj − 1 > 0, we have ρi = γij/εj ; and, from (B.16), country
i’s net marginal benefit from arming in percentage terms becomes:
∂V iT /∂G
i
V iT
∣∣∣∣
ti=tio
=
(
1− γ
i
j
εj
)
dZi/dGi
Zi
+
(
γij
εj
)
dZj/dGi
Zj
. (B.18)
Now recall, from (10b), that an increase in Gi given Gj implies less of the contested resource
for country j—i.e., dZj/dGi < 0 holds. Furthermore, while country i recognizes this effect
in its choice of arms under trade, it ignores this effect under autarky. Instead, as established
earlier, each country i under autarky chooses Gi effectively to maximize the income from
its production of Zi, which implies dZi/dGi = 0. Accordingly, for each of the two cases
above as well as more generally, country i’s net marginal benefit from arming under trade
evaluated at GiA given G
j is negative.18 Hence, country i’s incentive to arm (given Gj) is
17As one can easily verify, ∆ = σ when τ i = ti = 1.
18It is also possible to show, in a setting without tariffs, a decrease in either country i’s non-tariff trade
barriers (i.e., where initially τ i > 1) reduces each country’s net marginal benefit from arming.
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smaller under trade, whether costly or not. The only restriction we make here is that, given
trade costs, the strength of comparative advantage is sufficiently large to allow for strictly
positive trade flows.
B.2.3 Numerical Results for the Two-Country Setting
As was the case under free trade, a shift from an equilibrium under autarky to one with
trade could induce one adversary to increase its arming. Because the equilibrium under
(costly) trade is intractable analytically, we establish this point with the help of numerical
methods. In addition, we extend the analysis to explore the dependence of arming on
iceberg-type trade costs and tariffs. Finally we compare the various equilibria to the ones
that would arise if countries chose their tariffs and security policies optimally.
To identify the effects of changes in trade costs on equilibrium arming choices and
payoffs, let V i
Gi
= 0 (i = 1, 2) be the FOC condition associated with country i’s arming
under trade. Now let s denote a non-tariff or policy related trade cost. We then ask what is
the impact of an increase in s on the two countries’ arming decisions. It is straightforward
to show
dGiT
ds
=
1
D
[
(?)
V iGiGj
(?)
V j
Gjs
−
(−)
V j
GjGj
(?)
V iGis
]
(B.19a)
dGjT
ds
=
1
D
[
−
(−)
V iGiGi
(?)
V j
Gjs
+
(?)
V j
GjGi
(?)
V iGis
]
, (B.19b)
where D ≡ V i
GiGi
V j
GjGj
− V i
GiGj
V j
GjGi
. To ensure the equilibrium in arming is stable, we
assume D > 0. We also assume V i
GiGi
< 0 and V j
GjGj
< 0, so that the second-order condition
for each country’s optimizing choice of guns is satisfied. Clearly, the impact of a change in s
on arming depends on (i) the sign of its direct effect on both countries’ marginal payoffs due
to arming and, (ii) on whether their security policies are strategic substitutes or strategic
complements.
Our numerical simulations are based on a particular parameterization of the model that
assumes guns are produced by both countries with labor only and on a one-to-one basis,
implying Zi =
(
Ki + φiK0
)1−θ (
Li −Gi)θ, where θ ∈ (0, 1). When the distribution of
secure resources is sufficiently even to imply that both countries’ security policies exhibit
strategic complementarity in the neighborhood of the autarkic equilibrium, the analysis
yields predictable results. Thus, while we consider such cases below, we focus largely on
those cases where the distribution is extremely uneven, using figures to illustrate. The
figures assume θ = 0.2, α =∞, K1 = L1 = 1.95 and K2 = L2 = 0.05, with K0 = 1.19
19These assumptions imply that the two countries initially hold an identical ratio of capital to labor.
However, what matters in determining whether one country’s best-response function in the neighborhood of
the autarky equilibrium depends positively or negatively on its rival’s arming is the similarity of their ratios
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Non-tariff trade costs. Let us consider s = τ i, and assume neither country imposes
tariffs: ti = tj = 1. Then, country i’s FOC with respect to arming at an interior solution
requires ∂V
i/∂Gi
V i
|ti=1 = 0. It is straightforward to show, using (B.17), that V iGiτ i > 0 and
V j
Gjτ i
> 0.20 Accordingly, the following ideas can also be established with the help of
numerical analysis.
(a) If the countries’ secure factor endowments are sufficiently similar such that their se-
curity policies are strategic complements, then dGiT /dτ
i > 0 and dGjT /dτ
i > 0 hold.
It also follows that dGiT /dτ > 0 and dG
j
T /dτ > 0 for τ
i = τ j = τ .
(b) Now suppose the international distribution of secure factor endowments is uneven,
with country i having sufficiently greater secure endowments of both capital and la-
bor to imply V i
GiGj
> 0 while V j
GjGi
< 0. Based on the preceding analysis, it follows
that dGiT /dτ
i > 0, as illustrated for country i = 1 in Fig. B.3(a). Furthermore,
numerical simulations indicate that dGjT /dτ
i > 0 under most situations, which in-
clude the possible presence of asymmetric endowments. Nevertheless, for sufficiently
uneven distributions of secure endowments across countries, dGjT /dτ
i < 0 can hold,
as illustrated in Fig. B.3(b) for j = 2. This figure also illustrates that Gj responds
non-monotonically to changes in trade costs τ i. Moreover, it is possible for GjT > G
j
A
to hold at some trade-cost levels, including trade costs that are sufficiently close to
1 (free trade), as discussed earlier in the paper. This possibility can be seen in the
figure by comparing the curve labeled as τ2 =∞ (which corresponds to autarky, since
α =∞) with the other ones.
(c) Nonetheless, under most circumstances, globalization (i.e., τ i ↓ and/or τ j ↓) induces
both adversaries to reduce their equilibrium arming. Exhaustive numerical analy-
sis also establishes that d(GiT + G
j
T )/dτ
i > 0 under all circumstances (even when
dGjT /dτ
i < 0, as expected since country j’s sufficiently small size implies this effect is
relatively small).
Turning to payoffs, inspection of the welfare decomposition shown in (B.16) reveals that
the direct effect of globalization on either country’s payoff is positive. Since the smaller
country’s rival reduces its arming, the strategic payoff effect reinforces that direct effect.
Hence, globalization is always welfare enhancing for smaller countries. For the larger coun-
try, whose rival arms by more as with globalization, the strategic effect moves in the opposite
direction. However, exhaustive numerical analysis confirms that, even in this case, the di-
rect (and positive) effect dominates. Thus, we have dV iT /dτ
i < 0 and dV jT /dτ
i < 0, which
also suggests that V iT > V
i
A for i = 1, 2.
of residual secure capital to residual secure labor, kiZ shown in (7), after arming choices have been made.
20That is, sign{V iGiτi} = − sign{dρi/dτ i} = − sign{d(γi/∆)/dτ i} > 0 and similarly for the sign of V jGjτi .
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Tariffs. Now we consider s = ti, assuming no non-tariff trade costs: τ i = τ j = 1. In this
case, country i’s FOC with respect to arming at an interior solution requires ∂V
i/∂Gi
V i
|τ i=1 =
0. Analyzing the effects of tariffs on equilibrium arming and payoffs is considerably more
complex than analyzing the effects of non-tariff trade barriers. Specifically, because tariffs
generate revenues, signing the direct effects of tariffs on the marginal payoffs to arming V i
Giti
and V j
Gjti
becomes very difficult.21 Matters are further complicated by the dependence of
the parameter ρi on the signs of the cross partials V i
GiGj
, which are themselves difficult
to identify since changes in security policies also affect prices. Finally, establishing quasi-
concavity of V i in Gi and uniqueness of equilibrium under trade is also difficult. Even so,
we can use numerical methods to calculate (the unique) equilibrium under trade and its
dependence on tariffs. Highlighting our more interesting findings, we have:
(a) When the distribution of secure resources is severely uneven, the larger country i’s
security policyGi can be non-monotonic in its own tariff ti. In particular, as illustrated
in Fig. B.4(a) for i = 1, whether t2 = 1, t2 = 2, or t2 = t1, dG1T /dt
2 < 0 at low t1
levels, but dG1T /dt
1 > 0 at high t1 levels.22 This finding suggests that a large country’s
(i) trade policy (ti) can serve as a substitute for its security policy (GiT ) at low tariff
levels but as a complement at high tariff levels. By contrast, dGjT /dt
i > 0 at low
values of ti, whereas dGjT /dt
i < 0 at high ti values, as illustrated in Fig. B.4(b) for
j = 2. Thus, a small country (j) responds to protectionist moves by its relatively
large adversary (i) by increasing (reducing) its arming GjT at low (high) tariff rates.
(b) The findings above do change with alternative endowment configurations. In the case
of complete symmetry, for example, numerical analysis suggests the emergence non-
monotonicities with respect to changes in ti depends on the value of tj . In particular,
when tj is not large, more liberal trade policies by country i (ti ↓) are accompanied
by less aggressive security policies by both countries; dGiT /dt
i > 0 and dGjT /dt
i > 0.
(c) Numerical analysis reveals further (not shown) that trade liberalization by a small
county i (ti ↓) always induces a less aggressive security policy by its larger rival (j):
dGjT /dt
i > 0. But, such a trade policy by country i tends to affect its own security
policy non-monotonically and in a way that depends on its rival’s (j) trade policy.
For example, if tj = 1, then limti→1 dGiT /dt
i > 0, but dGiT /dt
i < 0 at large ti values;
however, if tj is large, then dGiT /dt
i < 0 for all ti.
21From (B.16), we see that sign{V iGiti} = − sign{dρi/dti}, where ρi now depends on ti directly and
indirectly through its dependence on expenditure shares and uncompensated price elasticities of import
demands which, in turn, depend on ti directly and indirectly through internal and external prices. The sign
of V j
Gjti
is simpler to compute since it does not depend directly on ti. However, it, too, depends on the
various elasticities noted above and expenditure shares.
22The last case where t2 = t1 is relevant when countries agree to sign reciprocal trade agreements that
involve equal tariff concessions to each other.
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Our numerical analysis also reveals a number of interesting tendencies for equilibrium
arming under various non-cooperative equilibria. Specifically, we compare arming under (i)
autarky (tj =∞), (ii) free trade (ti = tj = 1) and (iii) “generalized war” (ti = tiN ) which we
identify with the Nash equilibrium in tariff and security policies).23 Letting the subscripts
“A,” “F ,” and “W” respectively denote equilibrium values under autarky, free trade and
generalized war, we observe the following tendences:
(a) Under complete symmetry (and most circumstances):
GiF < G
i
W < G
i
A for i = 1, 2.
(b) When country i (j) is extremely large (small):
GiW < G
i
F < G
i
A, while G
j
A < G
j
F < G
j
W for i 6= j.
As expected, under complete symmetry (and more generally), autarky induces both coun-
tries to produce more guns as compared with the other equilibria. Free trade leads to
relatively less arming by each. However, for extremely uneven distributions in factor en-
dowments, matters change, as illustrated in Figs. B.4(a) and B.4(b).24 While the large
country (i = 1) continues to produce more arms under autarky, it tends to arm by less
under a generalized war than under free trade. We view this latter result as reflecting the
added flexibility (and muscle) afforded by generalized war for this country to manipulate its
TOT more effectively via its trade policy t1. The relatively smaller country (j = 2) tends to
arm by more under a generalized war than under free trade for exactly the opposite reasons.
The comparison of aggregate arming across these regimes is determined by the relatively
larger economy’s guns.
With (B.16), let us examine the welfare implications of tariffs. Focusing on dV iT /dt
i,
first note that the direct effect of an increase in ti on V iT is positive (negative) if t
i < tio
(ti > tio). We also need to examine the indirect effects. But, by the envelope theorem,
only the effect of ti on Gj is relevant. Keeping in mind that ∂V iT /∂G
j < 0, the nature of
this strategic effect depends on the initial level of ti. Fig. B.5(a) shows, for i = 1, that
limti→1 ∂V iT /∂t
i > 0 and limti→∞ ∂V iT /∂t
i < 0. The same figure also illustrates that it is
possible for country 1 to use its trade policy to improve its payoff beyond the level under
free trade V 1F .
Turning to the effects of ti on V jT , we can infer from (B.16) that the direct effect is
negative and that indirect effect due a change in GiT depends on the initial level of t
i. In
23The necessary FOCs for an interior equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game, which to the best of
our knowledge has not been studied before, are: V iGi = 0 and V
i
ti = 0 (i = 1, 2), which involve four equations
in four unknowns. V iGi = 0 is familiar from our earlier analysis. V
i
ti = 0 requires each country i to use its
tariff to balance at the margin its welfare gain due to a TOT improvement against its welfare loss due to an
adverse volume-of-trade effect. As noted earlier, ti = tio where t
i
o = ε
j/(εj − 1), j 6= i = 1, 2.
24That the quantities of guns associated with these equilibria are shown as being independent of t1 in the
figures is due to the fact that both guns and tariffs are endogenous.
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the case depicted in Figs. B.4 and B.5 for country j = 2, the indirect effect is positive
for small ti values and negative for large ti values. Still, it appears that the direct effect
dominates, so that dV 2T /dt
1 < 0. Because in all other cases the strategic effect is negative,
we also have dV 2T /dt
1 < 0.
Finally, we compare the payoffs under the various equilibria identified above (i.e., au-
tarky, generalized war, and free trade) and also throw into the mix the payoffs often consid-
ered in the literature that presumes no resource insecurity and thus no arming. Specifically,
we consider free-trade under “Nirvana” (or no arms) indicated with the subscript “FN”
and a trade war under “Nirvana” (again no arms) indicated with the subscript “WN .” The
payoff rankings depend on the distribution of secure endowments as follows:
(a) Under complete symmetry (and most circumstances):
V iA < V
i
W < V
i
F < V
i
WN < V
i
FN for i = 1, 2.
(b) When country i (j) is extremely large (small):
V iFN < V
i
WN < V
i
A < V
i
F < V
i
W and V
j
A < V
j
W < V
j
F < V
j
WN < V
j
FN for i 6= j.
As is well-known from standard theory, under complete symmetry and secure property, a
trade war (WN) has the features of a prisoner’s dilemma problem relative to free trade
(FN), such that V iWN < V
i
FN . What is not known is that we also have V
i
A < V
i
W < V
i
F in
this case. Interestingly, this ranking of payoffs is preserved for the smaller country when
the distribution of secure endowments is sharply uneven. By contrast, the payoff rankings
for larger country change in this case. We see that it prefers a generalized war (W ) over
a non-cooperative equilibrium in security policies coupled with free trade (F ). While this
result might seem surprising, it is consistent with the finding of Syropoulos (2002) that,
in the absence of insecure property, a sufficiently large country “wins” a tariff war over its
smaller trading partner. But, what is perhaps striking is that the extremely large country
prefers all of these equilibria to the ones under Nirvana (WN and FN).
B.2.4 Trade Costs between Friends
In this section, first we show how the model of three countries must be modified to incor-
porate non-tariff trade costs and conduct some preliminary analysis. After presenting our
proof to Proposition 7, we then provide some details concerning our numerical analysis.
Introducing non-tariff trade barriers. For our analysis of the three country case with
non-tariff trade costs, we select good 1 to be the numeraire and work with the relative
price ph in country h = 1, 2, 3 of good 2, which is the good in which country 3 enjoys a
comparative advantage. Optimization in consumption gives the standard demand functions
Di2 = γ
i
2Z
i/pi for i = 1, 2 and D32 = γ
3
2Z
3, where γi2 = (p
i)1−σ/(1 + (pi)1−σ) for i = 1, 2, 3.
Then, maintaining the assumption that each country specializes completely in the good in
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which enjoys a comparative advantage, we use these demand functions to write the world
market-clearing condition for good 2 as
τ1D12 + τ
2D22 +D
3
2 − Z3 = 0, (B.20)
where (as defined in the text) τ i reflects country i’s (iceberg) cost of importing good 2 from
the friendly country 3; country 3’s cost of importing good 1 from country i is τ3i (i = 1, 2).
Now let qi1 and q
i
2 denote the prices at which the goods 1 and 2 are exchanged between
countries i and 3. Also let qi = qi2/q
i
1 denote the relative external price of good 2 for country
i = 1, 2. For each country i, the no-arbitrage condition requires pi = pi2/p
i
1 = τ
iqi2/q
i
1 = τ
iqi.
From country 3’s perspective, we have p3 = p32/p
3
1 = q
i
2/(τ
3
i q
i
1) = q
i/τ3i , which implies
qi = τ3i p
3. Substituting this value of qi into pi = τ iqi gives pi = τ iτ3i p
3, which is the
no-arbitrage condition for adversarial country i (= 1, 2), expressed in terms of p3.25
Totally differentiating (B.20), one can find
p̂3 =
1
∆
[
νiẐi + νjẐj + νi
(
εi − 1) τ̂ i + νj (εj − 1) τ̂ j − νiεiτ̂3i − νjεj τ̂3j ] , (B.21a)
for i 6= j = 1, 2, where
∆ = ν1ε1 + ν2ε2 + ε3 − 1 (B.21b)
εi = 1 + (σ − 1) (1− γi2) , i = 1, 2 (B.21c)
ε3 = 1 + (σ − 1) γ32 (B.21d)
νi =
γi2Z
i/
(
τ3i p
3
)
γ12Z
1/
(
τ31 p
3
)
+ γ22Z
2/
(
τ32 p
3
) , i = 1, 2, (B.21e)
and where, as before, νi represents country i’s import share (and, under complete special-
ization, its demand share) of good 2.26 Assuming σ > 1, we have εi > 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and
once again ∆ > 1. In fact, as one can verify, ∆ > σ.27
Now differentiate country i’s indirect utility function V iT , as shown in (9) with p
i =
τ iτ3i p
3, with respect to Gi. Recognizing the dependence of the market clearing price p3 on
guns through Zi for i = 1, 2 as shown in (B.21a) gives country country i’s ( 6= j = 1, 2) FOC
25Observe that p3 = qi/τ3i for i = 1, 2, as domestic prices in 3 must be the same regardless of whether
good 1 is imported from 1 or 2. Of course, if τ3i = τ
3
j for i 6= j = 1, 2, then qi = qj .
26Note that, if τ31 = τ
3
2 and τ
1 = τ2, then γ12 = γ
2
2 , and thus ν
i = Zi/
(
Z1 + Z2
)
for i = 1, 2, which is the
special case of global free trade we studied in the text.
27Specifically, combine (B.21b), (B.21c) and (B.21d), to write ∆ = 1 + (σ − 1) [γ32 + νiγi1 + νjγj1] as
∆ = σ + (σ − 1)[−γ31 + νiγi1 + νjγj1] = σ + (σ − 1)[νi(γi1 − γ31) + νj(γj1 − γ31)].
Because consumers in country 3 face a higher relative price for their imports of good 1 than consumers in
country i (= 1, 2) for the same product, γi1 − γ31 > 0 (i = 1, 2) holds. Thus, σ > 1 implies ∆ > σ.
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for its optimizing choice Gi > 0 in the presence of trade costs:
dV iT /dG
i
V iT
=
(
1− ν
iγi2
∆
)
dZi/dGi
Zi
−
(
νjγi2
∆
)
dZj/dGi
Zj
= 0. (B.22)
Since ∆ > 1 > νiγi2 and dZ
j/dGi < 0 from (10b), this FOC reveals that dZi/dGi < 0 at an
interior optimum, which we assume is unique.
Proof of Proposition 7. To characterize the effect of trade costs under the assumption
that countries i = 1, 2 have identical initial endowments of capital and labor, suppose that
Gi = Gj and that the value Gi at that point uniquely satisfies the FOC in (B.22). Assuming
Zi = Zj , we have dZj/dGj = dZi/dGi, dZj/dGi = dZi/dGj , and
νi =
γi2/τ
3
i
γ12/τ
3
1 + γ
2
2/τ
3
2
, i = 1, 2. (B.23)
Next, we calculate the marginal effect of an increase in Gj on V jT at that point:
dV jT /dG
j
V jT
∣∣∣∣
Gj=Gi
=
 −dZi/dGjZi
∆
(
1− νiγi2∆
)
[ γi2γj2
γ12/τ
3
1 + γ
2
2/τ
3
2
]
Ej , (B.24a)
where
Ej ≡ 1
τ3i
(
1− γ
i
2
∆
)
− 1
τ3j
(
1− γ
j
2
∆
)
. (B.24b)
When τ i = τ j and thus γi2 = γ
j
2, our assumption that τ
3
i = τ
3
j implies E
j = 0. The unique
equilibrium, then, has GjT = G
i
T . For τ
i 6= τ j , the sign of the expression in (B.24a) tells us
how Gj compares with Gi; since dZi/dGj < 0, it is given by sign{Ej |τ3i =τ3j }. It is now easy to
show that τ i 6= τ j implies sign{Ej |τ3i =τ3j } = sign{γ
j
2−γi2}. Since pi = τ iτ3i p3 for i = 1, 2, we
have pi T pj as τ i T τ j for i 6= j = 1, 2. Thus, sign{∂V jT /∂Gj |Gj=Gi,τ3i =τ3j } = sign{τ i− τ j}.
Therefore, τ i Q τ j implies GiT R G
j
T as claimed. ||
Based on the expression for Ej in (B.24b), we can also explore what happens under
symmetric bilateral trade costs, where τ3i = τ
i for i = 1, 2. In this case, we rewrite Ej as
Ej
∣∣
τ3i =τ
i ≡ 1τ i
(
1− γ
i
2
∆
)
− 1
τ j
(
1− γ
j
2
∆
)
(B.25)
We can also rewrite country i’s expenditure share on good 2 as γi2 = [1 + [(τ
i)2p3]σ−1]−1.
Then, to compare the first and the second terms in E for values of τ i 6= τ j , it suffices to
study the dependence of the first term on τ i. Letting x ≡ [(τ i)2p3]σ−1, differentiation of
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the first term in (B.25) with respect to τ i gives
d
[
1
τ i
(
1− γ
i
2
∆
)]
/dτ i =
1 + x+ 2 (σ − 1)x−∆ (1 + x)2
∆ (τ i)2 (1 + x)2
< −x(1 + x) + (∆− 1)(1 + x
2)
∆ (τ i)2 (1 + x)2
< 0,
where the first inequality in the second line can be confirmed first by recalling ∆ > σ (> 1)
such that 2xσ < 2x∆. Then, after algebraic manipulation and rearrangement, we arrive at
the expression in the second line, which is clearly negative. The difference in results where
τ i = τ3i relative to the case considered in Proposition 7 is due to the fact that differences
in τ i = τ3i across i (= 1, 2) generate effects not only on expenditure shares, but also on
the import shares νi shown in (B.23) that have an opposite influence on country j’s TOT
channel and that dominate the former effect on expenditure shares. In any case, having
shown that the first term in the RHS of (B.25) is decreasing in τ i and, by analogy, the
second term is decreasing in τ j , we have established that sign{∂V jT /∂Gj |Gj=Gi,τ3i =τ i} =
sign{E|τ3i =τ i} = −sign{τ i − τ j}. Thus, as claimed in footnote 53 of the text, τ i Q τ j
implies GiT Q G
j
T when trade costs between trading partners are symmetric.
Numerical Analysis of Trade between Friends. The numerical results presented in
Section 5 are based on the same assumptions regarding technologies used in the two-country
case. In particular, we assume σ > 1 and that guns are produced by both countries with
labor only and on a one-to-one basis, implying Zi =
(
Ki + φiK0
)1−θ (
Li −Gi)θ, where
θ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure B.3: The Dependence of Arming on Non-Tariff Trade Costs
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Figure B.4: The Dependence of Arming on Tariffs
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Figure B.5: The Dependence of Payoffs on Tariffs
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B.3 Additional Details Underlying the Empirical Analysis
The first section of this part of the supplementary appendix (B.3.1) offers some details
regarding the estimating sample. The second section (B.3.2) describes how we obtain bi-
lateral trade costs from a structural gravity model. The third section (B.3.3) presents two
alternative procedures to aggregate bilateral trade costs to the country level. Finally, the
last section (B.3.4) discusses three robustness experiments.
B.3.1 Country Coverage and Rivalries
The countries included in our sample are listed Table B.1.28 Table B.2 reports summary
statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. Finally, Table B.3 lists the pair-year
rivalries from Thompson’s (2011) dataset that appear in our estimating sample. As Table
B.3 shows, Thompson’s indicator variable identifies, within our sample, rivalries between 12
pairs of countries with different durations. Accounting for the fact that the rivalries apply
in each direction of trade flows and a number of missing observations on military spending,
the total number of observations for rivalries used to estimate the impact of trade costs on
military spending in our model is 218 in each of the specifications in Table 1 of the main
text.
B.3.2 Obtaining Bilateral Trade Costs
In this section we construct and compare two alternative measures of bilateral trade costs:
“estimated” trade costs and “exact-match” trade costs. Both measures are based on the
following specification for trade flows from country i to country j in period t, Xij,t:
Xij,t = exp[χi,t+ϕj,t+υij+β1FTAij,t+β2WTO GATTij,t+
∑
t
βtBRDRij,t]×ij,t. (B.26)
This is the econometric version of the structural gravity equation, which is representative of
a very wide class of theoretical trade models, as demonstrated by Arkolakis et al. (2012) and
summarized in Head and Mayer (2014) and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014). Based
on our comparison of the two trade cost measures, we will choose one for our main analysis.
To ensure our constructed measures are sound, we implement the latest developments
in the related literature. First, we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) in the use of
the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator to account for the presence of
heteroskedasticity and zeros in trade data. Second, we use time-varying directional (i.e.,
exporter-time and importer-time) fixed effects (χi,t and ϕj,t, respectively) to account for the
unobservable multilateral resistances, as motivated by the seminal work of Anderson and
28The original dataset of Baier et al. (2019) includes 68 countries. The SIPRI database includes data on
military expenditure for all countries except Macau. Thus, our main estimating sample covers 67 countries.
It should also be noted that data on military expenditure for a few countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Qatar, and
China) are available only for some years. As a result, the number of observations in our sample is 904 (out
of a possible 938 observations if the panel were balanced).
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van Wincoop (2003). These fixed effects also will absorb national output and expenditure as
well as any other observable and unobservable country-specific variables that could impact
bilateral trade flows on the importer side or on the exporter side. Third, we employ a flexible
country-pair fixed effects approach to control for all (observable and unobservable) time-
invariant bilateral trade costs. As demonstrated by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the use of
pair fixed effects, represented by υij in (B.26), is an effective method to address the possible
endogeneity of any bilateral trade-policy variable. Finally, motivated by the empirical
gravity literature, we also include some additional time-varying bilateral covariates, such
as (i) FTAij,t, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i and j are members of a free
trade agreement (FTA) at time t, and zero elsewhere, and (ii) WTO GATTij,t, which is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when i and j are both members of WTO or GATT at time t, and
zero elsewhere. Following Bergstrand et al. (2015), we also include a series of time-varying
bilateral border dummies (
∑
t BRDRij,t), which control for common globalization forces.
Our first measure, “estimated” trade costs, uses the estimates of all bilateral variables
and fixed effects from equation (B.26) as follows:
t1−σij,t = exp[υˆij + βˆ1FTAij,t + βˆ2WTO GATTij,t +
∑
t
βˆtBRDRij,t]. (B.27)
This expression defines the power transform of bilateral trade costs based on structural
gravity theory, where σ > 1 can be interpreted broadly as the trade elasticity (Arkolakis et
al., 2012).29
The rich fixed effects structure of specification (B.26) (including bilateral fixed effects,
time-varying bilateral borders, exporter-time fixed effects, and importer-time fixed effects)
supports the assumption of a stochastic error term, ij,t. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that ij,t contains some systematic trade cost information. Anderson et al. (2018)
propose a hybrid approach, which uses a model similar to (B.27) to estimate the effects of
trade policy, and then adds the error to the trade-cost function in order to fit the trade
flows data perfectly. Specifically, “exact-match” trade costs can be constructed as follows:
t˜1−σij,t = t
1−σ
ij,t ×ij,t = exp[υˆij+βˆ1FTAij,t+βˆ2WTO GATTij,t+
∑
t
βˆtBRDRij,t]×ij,t. (B.28)
Below we compare the two constructs obtained from (B.27) and (B.28) to determine whether
it is reasonable to treat the error term in (B.26) as stochastic.30
Before that, let us briefly discuss the estimates of the bilateral gravity variables obtained
from specification (B.26). These estimates are reported in Table B.4. For the effects of
29Our notation here tij,t, which aims to capture trade costs generally, should not be confused with our
notation above in Section 4.2 and Supplementary Appendix B.2 (where t denotes tariffs).
30In the robustness analysis, we also experiment by constructing and using an alternative measure of
bilateral trade costs, which relies only on the estimates of the bilateral fixed effects, υˆij , from (B.26).
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FTAs, we obtain a statistically significant estimate of 0.375 (std.err. 0.032), which implies
that, ceteris paribus, the FTAs that entered into force during the period of investigation
promoted trade between their member countries by about 45.5 percent (100× [exp(0.375)−
1]). The estimate of the effect of WTO/GATT is also positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that WTO and GATT have also been successful in promoting trade among
member countries. Finally, consistent with Bergstrand et al. (2015), our estimates of the
border-time fixed effects (
∑
t BRDRij,t) reveal that the impact of international borders has
fallen over time, i.e., they capture the impact of globalization.31 Overall, these estimates
as plausible and comparable to corresponding estimates from the related literature.32
Next, we construct and compare the two measures of bilateral trade costs that are based
on (B.26), to choose between them for use in the second-stage of our analysis of military
spending. For this discussion, we focus on the last year in our sample, 1999; however,
our conclusions hold for each year in the sample. First, using a conventional value of
the elasticity of substitution σˆ = 6 (c.f., Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Head
and Mayer (2014)), we recover bilateral trade costs in levels (t̂ij,t), which are all positive
and greater than one, as suggested by theory.33 We note that the recovered values of t̂ij
using the “estimated” measure (B.27) vary widely but intuitively across the country pairs.
The lowest estimates are for country pairs that are geographically and culturally close and
economically integrated (e.g., USA and Canada), while the largest are for geographically
remote and economically less developed country pairs (e.g., Ecuador and Nepal).
Second, we compare the “estimated” trade costs from (B.27) with the “exact-match”
trade costs indexes from (B.28). The correlation between the two measures for all countries
in 1999 is 0.987. In addition, on a country by country basis, the correlations are positive,
varying between 0.40 and 0.99, and are quite strong in a very large majority of cases.
To get a better sense of the fit between “estimated” and “exact-match” bilateral trade
costs, we divide the countries into 3 groups. The first group includes the seven countries
in our sample (Malawi, Jordan, Myanmar, Kuwait, Malta, Nigeria, and Panama) having
correlations between the two sets of trade costs below 0.7. Malawi and Jordan are the only
two countries with a correlation of less than 0.5. Fig. B.6 illustrates the fit between the
“estimated” and the “exact-match” trade costs for three representative countries (Panama,
Myanmar, and Malawi) in this group. In this figure (and the two that follow), the trade-cost
31Note that the use of pair fixed effects does not allow the inclusion of border variables for all years, and
we need to drop one time-varying border variable. We chose the border for 1986. This means that the
estimates of all other border dummies should be interpreted as deviations from the border in 1986. Thus,
the positive and increasing estimates that we obtain indeed imply decreasing international border effects.
32See Head and Mayer’s (2014) excellent meta analysis for a benchmark set of gravity estimates.
33The structural gravity model can only identify relative trade costs and, with the pair-fixed effects in our
estimations, we have to impose N (67) normalizations. A natural choice is to set all intra-national trade
costs to one (tii = 1, ∀i ). Thus, we estimate international trade costs relative to intra-national trade costs.
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observations for a given country i against all other countries j 6= i are ordered (along the
horizontal axis) from smallest to largest according the “exact-match” measure. Fig. B.6
and the corresponding correlations reveal four patterns: (i) the worst correlations are for
poor nations, which are suspects of measurement errors in the reported data; (ii) the fit is
better for trade costs with partners that have relatively low trade costs; (iii) the dispersion
is wider for larger trade costs; and (iv) “estimated” trade costs somewhat under-predict
larger “exact-match” trade costs.
The second group includes the nine countries with correlations ranging from 0.7 to 0.9.
Fig. B.7, which depicts the fit between the “estimated” and the “exact-match” trade costs
for three representative countries in this group (Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Iran), reveals a
relatively good fit, with a bit wider dispersion corresponding to higher bilateral trade costs.
The last group includes the remaining countries (roughly 34 of those in our sample), all with
correlations greater than 0.9; for most of them, it is larger than 0.95. Fig. B.8 illustrates
the fit between the “estimated” and the “exact-match” trade costs for three representative
countries in this group, Austria, France, and the United States.
Finally, we note that we could not obtain estimates of the pair fixed effects (due to zero
trade flows throughout the whole period of investigation) for ten pairs of countries in our
sample. Only one of those pairs, Israel-Iran, was involved rival countries. To obtain our
main results, we treated the corresponding bilateral trade-cost observations (less than 0.4
percent in total) as missing. In addition, we also performed sensitivity analysis, where we
set the missing estimates of the pair fixed effects to be equal to the largest (in absolute
value) in the sample. Our main results remained robust.
In combination, (i) the good overall fit between “estimated” and “exact-match” trade
costs, (ii) the small fraction of trade flows for which “estimated” trade costs do not match
their “exact-match” counterparts well, which is concentrated in the case of poorer countries,
and (iii) the fact that trade data with less developed countries are noisier, suggest that the
error term in specification (B.26) may indeed be stochastic, reflecting noise rather than
systematic information. Therefore, the analysis in this section motivates and justifies our
choice to use the vector of “estimated” trade costs for the analysis of the determinants of
military spending.
B.3.3 Aggregating Bilateral Trade Costs
The next step we need to take to move towards the analysis of the determinants of military
spending is to aggregate the bilateral trade costs that we obtained in the previous section to
the country level. To this end, we consider two alternative aggregation procedures, both of
which are motivated by the structural gravity model of trade. For both, we define and focus
on τij,t ≡ tσ−1ij,t , to preserve the inverse relationship between trade flows and trade costs. In
76
the first aggregation procedure, we construct country-time specific weighted-average trade
costs for each exporter in our sample with importer expenditure shares used as weights:
τi,t =
∑
j
τij,t
Ej,t∑
Ej,t
. (B.29)
This procedure is motivated by structural gravity theory, but it is not perfectly consistent
with the structural gravity model, since proper aggregation should also take into account the
structural multilateral resistances.34 In particular, the gravity model implies the following
theory-consistent aggregation of bilateral trade costs to the country level:
τi,t =
∑
j
τij,t
Ej,t/P
1−σ
j,t∑
j Ej,t/P
1−σ
j,t
. (B.30)
While consistent with gravity theory, the procedure in (B.30) introduces additional endo-
geneity concerns for our purposes, since the multilateral resistances are general-equilibrium,
trade-cost indexes that include national income by construction. Therefore, to obtain our
main results, we employ equation (B.29) to aggregate bilateral trade costs up to the country-
time level. However, in the sensitivity analysis presented in the next section, we also ex-
periment with and demonstrate the robustness of our results when bilateral trade costs are
aggregated according to (B.30). To address potential endogeneity concerns in that case,
we also employ an IV estimation strategy following the methods of Feyrer (2009, 2019)
described in the main text.
B.3.4 Robustness Analysis
We conclude with three robustness experiments. The first one employs an alternative mea-
sure of the underlying bilateral trade-cost vector, based only on the estimates of the bilateral
fixed effects from the first stage:
t1−σij = exp[υˆij ] (B.31)
The motivation for this specification is to mitigate concerns due to the use of potentially
endogenous trade policy variables in our definition of trade costs. Our findings appear in
Table B.5, where, to ease comparison, we reproduce in column (1) the main IV estimates
from column (3) of Table 1 in the main text. For brevity of exposition, we only report
estimates based on the new trade costs from our most preferred IV specification. The
estimates in column (2) of Table B.5 confirm the robustness of our main findings to the use
of the alternative pair-fixed-effects measure of the underlying bilateral trade-cost vector.
In the second experiment, we employ the structural weights according to specification
34We refer the reader to Anderson and Neary (2005) and Agnosteva et al. (2014) for details and discussion
of consistent aggregation of bilateral trade costs with the gravity model.
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(B.30) to aggregate the bilateral trade costs to the country level. As noted before, the intro-
duction of the multilateral resistances (ideal consumer price indexes) could cause additional
endogeneity concerns. Therefore, once again, our preferred specification with this covariate
is the IV approach. The estimates in column (3) of Table B.5 are very similar to our main
findings from column (1) of the same table and, therefore, confirm their robustness.
In the last experiment, we test the robustness of our results by focusing on the Cold
War years in our sample, specifically 1986–1991. Once again, the estimates in column (4) of
Table B.5 confirm our main findings regarding the relationship between military spending
and trade with friends and rivals. In particular, the estimates of the coefficients on our
two key trade-cost covariates remain statistically significant, their signs are as predicted by
theory, and their magnitudes are comparable to our main findings.
Given the reduced-form nature of our evidence, we also considered one alternative ex-
planation for our main findings. In particular, since more aggressive countries have more
far-reaching geopolitical ambitions, they tend to have rivals that are located further away
and thus greater trade costs with them. At the same time, they tend to have larger military
budgets. To test whether these combined tendencies could explain our findings, we split
each of the two key trade cost covariates at their respective means. The results for trade
costs with friends and the results for trade costs with rivals were very similar for smaller
and for larger trade costs.35
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Table B.1: Country Coverage
ISO Code Country Name ISO Code Country Name
ARG Argentina KEN Kenya
AUS Australia KOR Korea, South
AUT Austria KWT Kuwait
BEL Belgium LKA Sri Lanka
BGR Bulgaria MAR Morocco
BOL Bolivia MEX Mexico
BRA Brazil MLT* Malta*
CAN Canada MMR Myanmar
CHE Switzerland MUS Mauritius
CHL Chile MWI Malawi
CHN China MYS Malaysia
CMR Cameroon NER Niger
COL Colombia NGA Nigeria
CRI Costa Rica NLD Netherlands
CYP Cyprus NOR Norway
DEU Germany NPL Nepal
DNK Denmark PAN Panama
ECU Ecuador PHL Philippines
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. POL Poland
ESP Spain PRT Portugal
FIN Finland QAT Qatar
FRA France ROM Romania
GBR United Kingdom SEN Senegal
GRC Greece SGP Singapore
HUN Hungary SWE Sweden
IDN Indonesia THA Thailand
IND India TTO Trinidad and Tobago
IRL Ireland TUN Tunisia
IRN Iran TUR Turkey
ISL* Iceland* TZA Tanzania
ISR Israel URY Uruguay
ITA Italy USA United States
JOR Jordan ZAF South Africa
JPN Japan
Notes: This table reports the ISO 3-letter codes and the names of the countries
in our sample. There were no data on institutional quality for two countries in
our sample. These countries are Iceland (ISL) and Malta (MLT), and they are
marked with ‘*’.
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Table B.3: Pair-Year Combinations for Rivals
ISO1 ISO2 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
ARG CHL 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . .
ARG GBR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BOL CHL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CHN IND 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CMR NGA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EGY IRN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EGY ISR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ESP MAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . .
GRC TUR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IRN ISR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ISR JOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . .
MWI TZA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . .
Notes: This table lists the pair-year combinations of rivalries that enter our sample.
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Table B.4: Panel PPML Gravity Estimates
Gravity Estimates
FTA 0.375
(0.032)∗∗
WTO GATT 0.142
(0.061)∗
BRDR 1987 0.019
(0.023)
BRDR 1988 0.100
(0.023)∗∗
BRDR 1989 0.108
(0.026)∗∗
BRDR 1990 0.178
(0.024)∗∗
BRDR 1991 0.191
(0.023)∗∗
BRDR 1992 0.216
(0.021)∗∗
BRDR 1993 0.229
(0.021)∗∗
BRDR 1994 0.299
(0.021)∗∗
BRDR 1995 0.374
(0.021)∗∗
BRDR 1996 0.384
(0.021)∗∗
BRDR 1997 0.478
(0.023)∗∗
BRDR 1998 0.533
(0.023)∗∗
BRDR 1999 0.517
(0.025)∗∗
N 60355
Notes: This table reports results from a panel
gravity estimation. The dependent variable is the
nominal level of bilateral trade flows, and the es-
timates are obtained with the PPML estimator.
The specification includes exporter-time fixed ef-
fects, importer-time fixed effects, and pair fixed
effects, whose estimates are omitted for brevity.
Standard errors are clustered by country pair and
are reported in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < .05,
∗∗ p < .01.
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Table B.5: International Trade Costs and Military Spending: Robustness Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MAIN PAIR FEs STRCTRL COLD WAR
TRADE COSTS RIVALS 0.214 0.208 0.206 0.261
(0.082)∗∗ (0.081)∗ (0.084)∗ (0.126)∗
TRADE COSTS FRIENDS -0.226 -0.228 -0.213 -0.322
(0.065)∗∗ (0.068)∗∗ (0.050)∗∗ (0.095)∗∗
TRADE COSTS NR -0.152 -0.153 -0.166 -0.181
(0.036)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗ (0.029)∗∗ (0.048)∗∗
GDP 1.347 1.349 1.295 1.383
(0.068)∗∗ (0.070)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗ (0.111)∗∗
PPLN -0.507 -0.508 -0.477 -0.567
(0.044)∗∗ (0.044)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗
INSTITUTIONS -0.053 -0.052 -0.051 -0.055
(0.009)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗
HOSTILE 2.525 2.547 2.598 2.381
(0.441)∗∗ (0.437)∗∗ (0.423)∗∗ (0.502)∗∗
RIVALS -0.379 -0.376 -0.407 0.052
(0.416) (0.431) (0.459) (0.618)
RLTV POWER 0.234 0.223 0.269 0.203
(0.129)+ (0.128)+ (0.135)∗ (0.218)
N 810 810 810 307
Weak Id χ2 65.793 62.360 59.905 30.237
Over Id χ2 1.456 1.431 1.618 1.019
Notes: This table reports the results from three robustness experiments. The dependent variable
is always the logarithm of national military spending. All specifications distinguish between the
impact of trade costs of countries that have rivals to their rivals (TRADE COSTS RIVALS) or to
their friends (TRADE COSTS FRIENDS). Each specification includes year fixed effects and all
estimates are obtained with an IV estimator. For comparison purposes, the estimates in column
(1) are the results from column (3) of Table 1 in the main text. The results in column (2) are based
on bilateral trade costs that are constructed only from the estimates of the pair fixed effects using
a structural gravity model. Column (3) reports results that are obtained from trade costs that
are aggregated with structural gravity weights. Finally, column (4) replicates the main results in
column (1) but only for the Cold War years in our sample, i.e. 1986-1991. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. See the discussion in section B.3.4
of this appendix for further details.
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Figure B.6: Estimated vs. Exact-match Trade Costs
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Notes: This figure plots “estimated” vs. “exact-match” trade costs for 1999, which
are obtained from gravity specification (B.26), for Panama, Malawi and Myanmar.
See text for further details.
84
Figure B.7: Estimated vs. Exact-match Trade Costs
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Notes: This figure plots “estimated” vs. “exact-match” trade costs for 1999, which
are obtained from gravity specification (B.26), for Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Iran. See
text for further details.
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Figure B.8: Estimated vs. Exact-match Trade Costs
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Notes: This figure plots “estimated” vs. “exact-match” trade costs for 1999, which
are obtained from gravity specification (B.26), for Austria, France, and the United
States. See text for further details.
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